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How Sarbanes-Oxley Should be Used to Expose the Secrets
of Discretion, Judgment, and Materiality of the
Auditor's Report
Arthur Acevedo
I. INTRODUCTION
For many individuals, the auditor's report symbolizes the hallmark
of professional integrity, independence and due care.1 However, the
public's trust and confidence in the auditor's report came to a crashing
halt when a wave of financial scandals plagued the American land-
scape during 2001 and 2002. Public trust in the auditor and the audi-
tor's report quickly eroded as company after company announced
corrections of restatements of earlier audited financial statements.
Responding to this breach of public trust by the audit profession,
Congress passed the Sarbanes Oxley-Act ("SOA"). 2 The enactment
of the SOA is intended to make the audit profession more accounta-
ble and to restore public confidence in the audit profession. The SOA
introduced many reforms aimed at improving and enhancing financial
reporting and at regulating the accounting and audit professions.
However, in its enthusiasm to pass the SOA, Congress overlooked an
opportunity to enhance the auditor's report and clarify its role within
the context of an audit.
The Securities Act of 19333 ('33 Act) and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19344 ('34 Act) both require the inclusion of an auditor's report
to validate the financial statements accompanying the required disclo-
sures. Ironically, however, the auditor's report has become the source
of dashed expectations, confusion, and misplaced reliance by the
public.5
1. See Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and
Ideology, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 59-60 (2003) (stating, "[t]he auditor's opinion on the financial
statements is like an expert's stamp of approval to the public and the capital markets.").
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 77a - 77aa
(2005)).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78nn (2005)).
5. As used in this note, the terms "public" and "user" are used interchangeably to include any
person or entity who may come to rely on the auditor's report including but not limited to
investors, creditors, suppliers and the general public.
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Since its introduction into the American business community, the
auditor's report has created different expectations concerning the
scope of its use.6 Businesses secure it as objective evidence that their
financial statements are accurate, third parties rely on it as a gauge
that the business is capable of meeting its obligations, and auditors
provide it as part of their professional services to the client. All too
frequently, however, conflicts concerning the scope and use of the au-
ditor's report between the public, on the one hand, and auditors, on
the other, have led to litigation with plaintiffs charging the auditor
with negligence, gross negligence or in some cases fraud.
Add to the mix the little known fact that corporate management
("Management") has considerable discretion 7 in determining which
accounting rules 8 to adopt when measuring its financial results, plus
the poorly understood fact that the auditor exercises a substantial de-
gree of discretion and professional judgment at every stage of the au-
dit process, 9 plus the fact that the number of people reading the
auditor's report has increased,10 and you have the elements for a
likely dispute between the auditor and the public.
Part I of this note states the problem. Part II of this note examines
the legal and regulatory framework within which the audit profession
works. Part III of this note examines the history of the audit profes-
6. See Steven E. Stark, Rosenblum v. Adler: Auditors' Liability For Negligent Misrepresenta-
tion - "The Explosive Power Resident in Words," 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 939, 955 (1984)
The Rosenblum court.., discussed the expanding role of the audit function and recog-
nized that an accepted use of audited statements is to provide them to third parties.
The court found that 'proper business purposes' include such uses as submission of the
statements to banks and other lending institutions that might advance funds, and to
suppliers of goods and services that might advance credit.
Id. (citing Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983)).
7. See Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes To Auditing?, 36 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 57, 64 (2002) (stating, "[c]orporations may lawfully manage their earnings in compliance
with GAAP. In addition, corporations may place their financial disclosure in a favorable light
that does not misrepresent their true financial position to investors.").
8. Accounting can be defined as a process which involves "identifying, [financial] events and
transactions that affect the entity. Once identified, these items are measured, recorded, classi-
fied and summarized in the accounting records." WILLIAM BOYNTON ET AL., MODERN AUDIT-
ING 44 (7th ed. 2001); see also DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 2 (10th
ed., 2001), (defining accounting "by describing, the three essential characteristics of accounting:
(1) identification, measurement and communication of financial information about (2) economic
entities to (3) interested persons." In simple terms, accounting is a process which identifies,
measures, records and reports financial information to the public.).
9. One commentator has described "[a]uditing [as] a mix[ture] of judgment and technique
which may result in certain pitfalls. Feinman, supra note 1, at 22. Audit procedures require that
an auditor plan his audit. It is conceivable that based on the audit procedures selected and tests
conducted, two different auditors auditing the same client may arrive at different conclusions.
10. Consider the fact that the "modern securities markets, literally involv[e]...millions of
shares changing hands daily..." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S.Ct. 978, 995 (1988).
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sion, the evolution of the audit opinion and provides the reader with a
basic understanding of the auditing function and its processes." Part
IV of this note examines the applicable case law and the evolution of
the legal standards affecting the auditor. Part V of this note concludes
with a recommendation that aggressive action be taken by Congress
to prevent further abuses in financial reporting by corporate manage-
ment and the audit profession. The recommended action includes re-
forming the auditor's report so that minimum content disclosure rules
are adopted, disclosing the limitations of the auditor's report, adopt-
ing Plain English rules to enable increased comprehension and better
decision making by the public, 12 and expanding the scope of the SOA
to include all audit reports affecting interstate commerce. 13
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal and regulatory framework of the audit profession after
the SOA
Early attempts to federally regulate the auditing profession at the
start of the 20th century met with considerable resistance from a then
fledgling audit profession. 14 These attempts at regulation were in re-
sponse to a growing perception and a need for uniform auditing stan-
dards and standardized reporting. The "formation of [the] Federal
11. The goal of this section is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the concep-
tual principles applicable to an audit without burdening the reader with an overwhelming
amount of financial and audit information. A comprehensive understanding of accounting and
auditing is beyond the scope of this work.
12. Increased reporting and disclosure will enable shareholders to better assess whether the
managers they hired are properly managing the business. Shareholders, out of sheer personal
interest, can act as an early warning system that something is wrong with the company. See Mary
Alexander, Corporate Greed, 38 Ocr. TRIAL 9 (2002) (crediting shareholders of World Coin,
Tyco and Rite Aid as acting as an early warning system of the looming financial doom).
13. Currently, the scope of the SOA applies only to audit reports issued by publicly held
companies. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 2, §2(a)(7) (defining "issuer" to mean
"...an issuer (as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c)), the
securities of which are registered under section 12 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 781), or that is required
to file reports under section 15(d) (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), or that files or has filed a registration
statement that has not yet become effective under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa), and that it has not withdrawn.").
14. The content of financial statements became federally regulated in 1934. See George J.
Benston, The Regulation Of Accountants and Public Accounting Before and after Enron, 52 EM-
ORY L.J. 1325, (2003)
Until passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the contents of financial statements in-
cluded in prospectuses were regulated only by some state laws and securities ex-
changes' listing agreements. The contents of periodic financial statements of
corporations were regulated only by securities exchanges until passage of the Securities
Act of 1934, which also established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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Reserve Board ("FRB") in 1913 and the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") in 1914 played an important role in the movement that fos-
tered standardized audit reporting... [T]he FRB and the FTC shared
a strong dissatisfaction with financial statements audited by public ac-
countants. ",15 The American Institute of Accountants ("AIA"), a
predecessor organization to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants ("AICPA"), deliberated with the FRB and FTC about
the need for standardized reporting. The AIA urged the FRB and the
FTC "that federal regulation of the accounting profession was not
warranted .... "16 The FRB and the FTC "yielded to the pressure of
the AIA with the understanding that the AIA would "provide ade-
quate guidelines [to] independent accountants that would address
their concerns. ' 17 This early concession by the FRB and FTC was a
striking victory for the auditor because it meant the auditor retained
the right to self regulation.
Over the next 85 years the audit profession grew in size and influ-
ence.' 8 The audit profession established standards of practice, known
as generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), 19 and gener-
ally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"). 20 "GAAS ... represent
the industry standard for measuring the performance of an [audit] ex-
amination by an [auditor]." 2a GAAP is the standard used to measure
and report a company's financial transactions. The audit profession
15. Marshall A. Geiger, Setting The Standard For The New Auditor's Report: An Analysis Of
Attempts To Influence The Auditing Standards Board, 1 STUDIES IN MANAGERIAL AND FINAN-
CIAL ACCOUNTING 12 (1993).
16. Id..
17. Id.
18. "In 1900, there were fewer than 250 CPA's in the United States and no more than 1,000
persons employed in all the nation's accounting firms. Today, there are over 500,000 licensed
CPA's in the United States." BOYNTON, supra note 8, at 9.
19. See In re Enron Corporation Securities, Derivative & Erisa Litigation, 235 F. Supp. 2d
549, 573 n.ll (S.D. Tex. 2002) ("GAAP, or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 'are the
official standards adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the
"AICPA"), a private professional association, through three successor groups that it established,
the committee on Accounting Procedure, the accounting Principles Board (the "APB"), and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (the "FASB")." (quoting In re K-tel Intern., Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation, 300 F.3d 881, 889 (8th Cir. 2002); see also, KIEsO, supra note 8, at 6 (elaborating
that "[t]he term 'generally accepted' means either that an authoritative accounting rule-making
body has established a principle of reporting in a given area or that over time a given practice
has been accepted as appropriate because of its universal application.").
20. See Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 674 n. 106 ("GAAS are standards established by the
Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants for the
conduct of auditors in the performance of an [audit] examination.").
21. Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 611. But see James L. Costello, The Auditor's Responsibilities
For Fraud Detection And Disclosure: Do The Auditing Standards Provide A Safe Harbor?, 43
ME. L. REV. 265, 282 (1991), for an excellent discussion exploring "the fallacy that compliance
with GAAS creates a safe harbor for the auditor."
[Vol. 4:1
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also helped establish the CPA Examination, which is a uniform exami-
nation administered twice a year for individuals desiring to practice as
certified public accountants. 22
However, a flurry of accounting restatements 23 during 2000, 2001,
and 2002,24 and an ambush of accounting scandals25 prompted Con-
gress to enact the SOA, thereby federally regulating the audit profes-
sion. As a direct consequence of the SOA, the auditing profession lost
its right to self-regulation. By enacting the SOA, Congress sought to
stabilize the capital markets and restore public confidence in the eco-
nomic system.26
The roots of the 2001-2002 financial crisis can be attributed to sev-
eral factors: aggressive accounting practices,27 the increased use of
pro-forma financial statements, 28 and the misplaced belief by investors
in the never-ending climb of the Dow Jones. 29 Millions of investor
dollars poured into the economy, primarily in the dot-com and in-
22. Individuals desiring to practice as a certified public accountant (CPA) must successfully
pass a uniform examination and meet local state licensing requirements before they can be des-
ignated a CPA.
23. An accounting restatement is a correction of a previously issued financial statement.
24. During the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, many companies including Enron, Tyco and
WorldCom announced they were restating their earnings because of accounting irregularities.
See also Letter from Lynn Turner, SEC Chief Accountant, to Charles Bowsher, Chairman, Pub-
lic Oversight Board (July 18, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/staffletters/
pob071801.htm (last visited September 7, 2004) (asking "why is there nothing showing up in the
reports from the peer reviews regarding" the increase in restatements?).
25. During the period January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002, the GOA published a report "listing
919 restatements.. .identified as.. .accounting irregularities." Letter from Davi M. D'Agostino,
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, GAO, to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
(January 17, 2003) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03395r.pdf (last visited September
18, 2004). Investors immediately lost "$100 billion" in market value as a result of the accounting
restatements. Id.. See also James D. Cox, Reforming The Culture of Financial Reporting: The
PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, n.4 (2003)
("Earnings restatements are symptomatic of the aggressive and opportunistic use of accounting
principles. Opacity and lacunae in accounting metrics were shamelessly exploited by the firms'
managers. Too frequently, it appears, the public accountants accorded their audit clients the
benefit of any ambiguity in accounting principles.").
26. See Larry Cata Backer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Federalizing Norms for Officer, Lawyer,
and Accountant Behavior, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 897, 947 (2002) ("The American financial sys-
tem is based on an acceptance of the 'facts' of transparent and liquid markets in which all traders
are engaged in the market with equal information and the information fairly represents the rela-
tive condition of all market issuers." (emphasis added)).
27. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Revenue Recognition and Corporate Counsel, 56 SMU L.
REV. 885, 909 (2003) (giving an excellent discussion concerning the more common revenue de-
ception techniques used by companies to inflate earnings).
28. "Pro-forma information is useful to individuals interested in assessing the trend of earn-
ings over a period of time." KIESO ET AL., supra note 8, at 1258.
29. See Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Address
at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Pub-
lic Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 5, 1996) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
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ternet stock sectors. However, when the economic bubble burst dur-
ing 2001, it left in its wake, lingering economic and social
consequences that will be felt for many years to come.
When Congress faced a similar economic crisis following the 1929
stock market crash, it responded with legislation designed to restore
confidence in the capital markets. Although the reasons for the 2001-
2002 financial crisis differ from those that caused the 1929 stock mar-
ket crash, the economic and social consequences are similar - namely,
unemployment, lost fortunes, mistrust, and lack of investor confi-
dence.30 Following the stock market crash in 1929, investors lost con-
fidence as fraud and manipulation of the capital markets brought ruin
to millions of individuals. Determined to address the devastating eco-
nomic and social hardship created by the 1929 crash, Congress passed
the '33 Act and the '34 Act to restore confidence in the American
economy and in the capital markets.
The '33 Act was designed to provide investors with "full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate . . .com-
merce . . . and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof .... "31 The '33
Act protects investors against fraud by unscrupulous dealers and im-
poses severe civil liabilities on violators. A significant feature of the
'33 Act is that it requires that an auditor's report accompany any pro-
spectus 32 filed with the SEC.33 The presence of the auditor's report
lends credibility to the accompanying financial statements. 34
One year later, Congress passed the '34 Act to protect investors
against the manipulation of stock prices by regulating transactions
upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets. The '34
boarddocs/speeches/1996/default.htm (last modified Jan. 5, 2005) (Where Greenspan made his
now famous remarks regarding the "irrational exuberance" of investors).
30. See Bartholomew, supra note 7, at 106.
Investors may lose confidence in the U.S. equity markets if changes in financial report-
ing do not take place to illuminate true financial conditions. The SEC has warned of a
corrosive deterioration of U.S. market leadership because of the current prevalent gim-
mickry and attendant reduced transparency of financial reporting. If investors are una-
ware of the true financial conditions of corporations, the investors are not able to
allocate their capital in a rational and efficient manner.
Id.
31. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (Preamble).
32. A prospectus is defined as a "printed document that describes the main features of an
enterprise (esp. a corporation's business) and that is distributed to prospective buyers or inves-
tors..." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (7th ed. 1999).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77aa (2005).
34. The SEC has the statutory authority to establish the accounting rules to be followed by
companies who are required to register their financial statements with the SEC. See Securities
Act of 1933, supra note 3, § 77s(a) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 4,
§ 78m(b)(1) (2005).
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Act also imposed regular information reporting requirements on com-
panies who listed their stock on national securities exchanges. The '34
Act requires that public companies file an annual report35 within 90
days following the end of the fiscal year.36 The '34 Act also requires
that the "annual report [be] certified . . by independent public ac-
countants. '37 Public companies must also file quarterly reports within
45 days following the end of each quarter.38
Congress now seeks to influence the practice and behavior of the
audit professions through the SOA. The SOA's principal reforms in-
clude the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("Board"); establishing standards for auditing, attestation,
quality control and ethics within the audit profession; requiring certifi-
cation of financial statements and internal controls by the corporate
officers; enhanced real time reporting/disclosure requirements;
strengthening auditor independence; requiring that auditors report to
the audit committee; and the enactment of penalties for certain securi-
ties related crimes. The passage of the SOA represents the most com-
prehensive legislation affecting the capital markets since the passage
of the '33 Act and the '34 Act.39
B. The Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board
Section 101(a) of the SOA creates the Public Companies Account-
ing Oversight Board ("Board"). The purpose of the Board is to
"oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securi-
ties laws . . . in order to protect the interests of investors and [to]
further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate,
and independent audit reports for ... investors. '40 The Board is man-
dated to "provide... more effective oversight" and regulation of the
audit profession.41 The creation of the Board marks the end of the era
of self regulation by the audit profession because the Board is now
charged with overseeing the audit profession. Prior to the creation of
the Board, the audit profession was a self-regulating industry.
35. Annual reports are filed on Form 10-K, quarterly reports are filed on Form 10-Q.
36. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 4, §78m(a).
37. See id. § 78m(a)(2).
38. 17 C.F.R. §240.13A-13 (2005). See also Form 100, General Instructions, at A.1.
39. Additional securities statutes passed by Congress since passing the '33 Act and the '34 Act
include the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §79 2005); the Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §77aaa (2005); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §80b-
1 (2005); and the Securities Investors Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (2005).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 2, § 101(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
41. See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 4 (2002).
2005]
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The Board consists of five members42 who "shall be... appointed
from.., prominent individuals of integrity and reputation,43 who have
a demonstrated commitment to the interests of investors and the pub-
lic, and an understanding of the responsibilities for and nature of the
financial disclosures required of issuers under the securities laws and
the obligations of accountants with respect to the preparation and is-
suance of audit reports . . .,,44 The five members of the Board are
appointed by the SEC.45 Only two of the five members shall be (or
shall have been) certified public accountants. 46 The Board is solely
dedicated to fulfilling the objectives of the SOA and is authorized to
hire a qualified staff to help it achieve its objectives.
The SOA vests the Board with broad authority empowering it to
regulate public accounting firms. Principle among its newly created
powers is the ability of the Board to "register public accounting
firms,"'4 7 "establish ... auditing, quality control, ethics, independence
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports.. .," 48
"perform such other duties or functions as... are necessary or appro-
priate.., to improve the quality of audit services," 49 "conduct investi-
gations and disciplinary proceedings, '50 and "enforce compliance with
the Act."'51
42. See United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission, Actions Needed to Improve Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board Selection Process, GAO-03-399 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d03339.pdf (last visited September 25, 2004) (describing the challenges the SEC faced
in appointing the initial Board and the GOA recommendation that the "SEC defime and reach
agreement on the PCAOB appointment process). The current members of the Board are Wil-
liam J. McDonough- Chairman, Kayla J. Gillan - Member, Daniel L. Goelzer - Member, Bill
Gradison - Member, Charles D. Niemeier - Member.
43. Reasonable minds may differ as to what a "prominent individual of integrity and reputa-
tion" means. Consider for example, that Kennth Lay, former CEO of the now defunct Enron
Corporation, touted at one time as one of the preeminent CEO's in the world, would have
qualified under the standards set forth by the SOA.
44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, supra note 2, § 101(e)(1).
45. Id. at § 101(e)(4)(A).
46. Section 101(e)(2) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reads "Two members, and only 2 members,
of the Board shall be or have been certified public accountants pursuant to the laws of 1 or more
States, provided that, if 1 of those 2 members is the chairperson, he or she may not have been a
practicing certified public accountant for at least 5 years prior to his or her appointment to the
Board." Id. § 101(e)(2).
47. Id. § 101(c)(1).
48. Id. § 101(c)(2) (emphasis added).
49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(c)(5).
50. Id. § 101(c)(3).
51. Id. § 101(c)(4). It bears mentioning that although the statute empowers the Board with
the power to enforce compliance with the Act, any such hearings "shall not be public, unless
otherwise ordered by the Board for good cause shown, with the consent of the parties to such
hearing." Id. § 105(c)(2); see also the SEC regulation which provides that "[ulnless otherwise
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The SOA empowers the Board with the authority to require public
accounting firms to "describe in each audit report the scope of the
auditor's testing of the internal control structure and procedures of
the [company] and [to] present (in such report or in a separate report)
the findings of the auditor .... "52 The auditor is also required to
provide an evaluation as to "whether [the] internal control structure
and procedures... provide[s] reasonable assurance that [the] transac-
tions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of the finan-
cial statements in accordance with GAAP.' '53 Simply stated, the
Board has the authority to require that the auditor report whether the
company's internal control system is working and whether such inter-
nal controls make it possible to for the company to prepare its finan-
cial statements in accordance with GAAP.
Public accounting firms 54 must register with the Board if they want
to continue auditing publicly held companies.5 5 Public accounting
firms are also required to "submit an annual report to the Board... to
update the information contained in its application for registration
. ... "56 Information received from public accounting firms by the
Board is available for public inspection. However, certain confiden-
tial and proprietary information "reasonably identified" by the ac-
counting firm shall be protected from public disclosure.57 In the end,
the loss of self-regulation coupled with increased oversight by the
Board is expected to create a more transparent audit environment
that is ultimately intended to provide enhanced protection for the av-
erage investor.
ordered by the Commission, all formal investigative proceedings shall be non-public." 17 C.F.R.
§ 203.5 (2003).
52. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii)(I).
53. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(iii)(II)(bb).
54. Section 2(a)(11) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act defines a public accounting firm as a "legal
entity... engaged in the practice of public accounting or preparing or issuing audit reports." Id.
§ 2(a)(11)(A).
55. See id. § 102(a).
56. Id. § 102(d).
57. Id. § 102(e). In the interest of full disclosure and transparency, due consideration should
be given to making the confidential reports publicly available for inspection after a reasonable
period of time. It is in the public interest, defined broadly to include investors, creditors, suppli-
ers, the insurance industry, and the audit profession, that audit deficiencies previously identified,
be disclosed and corrected. The pressure of public disclosure and scrutiny will help ensure that
corrections are made.
2005]
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C. Standard setting authority - Section 103 (and regulating the
auditor's report)
Section 103 of the SOA vests the Board with the authority to "es-
tablish ... auditing and related attestation standards,... quality con-
trol standards, and ... ethics standards ... used by registered public
accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of audit reports
.... ,,58 The Board has the authority to establish such standards "...
as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors." 59 This mandate has broad implications be-
cause at least since 1940, "the SEC [consciously] refrained from estab-
lishing separate auditing procedures and decided to let the accounting
profession develop auditing standards. '60
Using its mandate under § 103, the Board has the authority to sig-
nificantly change GAAP, GAAS, and the reporting standards used by
the audit profession. The SOA has already commissioned the study of
accounting principles used by auditors.61 However, to complete the
SOA's objective of "protect[ing] investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of corporate disclosures, '62 the auditor's report must
also be critically examined. Specifically, the Board should use its
broad grant of authority to conduct a review of and enact improve-
ments to the auditor's report. If one reflects upon the objective of the
SEC disclosure rules, namely to ensure that fair disclosure is made to
investors, then the goal of drafting an auditor's report that itself is
comprehensible and meaningful to the average investor is consistent
with the SEC's policy of disclosure.
Any change to the GAAP, GAAS, and reporting standards
adopted by the Board must include a careful assessment of current
standards. The Board is required to cooperate "on an ongoing ba-
sis ''63 with professional groups of accountants when evaluating stan-
dards. Presumably the professionai groups of accountants will include
the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). 64 Additionally,
58. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(1) (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 103(a)(1).
60. Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, In Part Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 870 (2005).
61. Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires "a study on the adoption by the United
States financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting system." Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 108(d). The report can be found at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm.
62. See id. pmbl.
63. Section 103(c)(1) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides in relevant part that "[t]he Board
shall cooperate on an ongoing basis with professional groups of accountants ... in the examina-
tion of the need for changes in any standard." Id. § 103(c)(1).
64. The FASB website describes "[t]he mission of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
is to establish and improve standards of financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and
[Vol. 4:1
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the Board may include "representatives of other interested groups"
when evaluating standards.65 The Board is also required to report
"the results of its standard setting responsibilities" to the SEC on an
annual basis.66 No rule of the Board can take effect without the prior
approval of the SEC.67 As a final safeguard against overreaching
changes by the Board, the SEC reserves to itself the right to override
any rule enacted by the Board.68
Prior to the enactment of § 103, the SEC, through Regulation S-X,
provided limited guidance concerning the content of the auditor's re-
port.69 Regulation S-X requires only that the auditor's report "[be
dated .... be signed manually. . . , indicate the city and State where
issued . . . , and identify ... the financial statements covered by the
report.70 Regulation S-X further provides that the auditor's report
"[s]hall state whether the audit was made in accordance with
[GAAS]."'71 Regulation S-X, however, does not require a definition
of GAAP or GAAS within the body of the auditor's report, nor does
it require any discussion within the auditor's report concerning the
impact of materiality (or its consequence to the financial state-
ments), 72 the presence of "audit risk," 73 or Managements discretion to
choose among alternative GAAP treatments when preparing a com-
pany's financial statements. 74 Disclosing these items within the body
of the auditor's report would make it more meaningful and informa-
education of the public, including issuers, auditors, and users of financial information." http://
www.fasb.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
65. Section 103(a)(4) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, captioned "ADVISORY GROUPS," pro-
vides in relevant part that "The Board shall convene,... such expert advisory groups as may be
appropriate, which may include practicing accountants and other experts, as well as representa-
tives of other interested groups.., to make recommendations concerning the content of auditing
... standards." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 103(a)(4).
66. Id. § 103(d).
67. Id. § 107(b)(2).
68. Id. § (b)(5).
69. Regulation S-X governs the disclosure of financial information in the auditor's report. 17
C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to .3-11 (2003); see also Regulation S-K, 17 C.ER. §§ 229.101-.406 (2003)
(governing the disclosure of non-financial information). Throughout the history of the auditor's
report, the audit profession, acting through the AICPA and its predecessor organizations, took
the lead role in evaluating and determining the form and content of the auditor's report.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(a) (2004).
71. Id. § 210.2-02(b).
72. See discussion of the concept of materiality infra Part C.
73. See discussion of audit risk infra Part C and note 181.
74. Examples of alternate GAAP treatments available to Management include choosing be-
tween straight line depreciation or accelerated depreciation methods when recording deprecia-
tion expense attributable to an asset (e.g., equipment) for the year. Another example of an
alternative GAAP treatment available to Management includes choosing the last in first out
(LIFO) or the first in first out (FIFO) basis when calculating inventory costs.
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tive to the public. Disclosing these items would also increase the audi-
tors' credibility as a "public watchdog."
The discontent with the lack of clear audit and accounting standards
is not a new phenomenon. At the start of the 1900's there existed a
strong dissatisfaction with the lack of uniformity and standardization
of the auditor's report. The "wide disparity in ... [auditing] practice
and [the wide disparity in the auditor's] report form and content cre-
ated difficulties for the early audit report reader. In some cases, the
audit report was a relatively useless document. '75
Responding to the criticism concerning the lack of standards the
AIA, in 1912, "developed a booklet entitled A Memorandum on Bal-
ance Sheet Audits .... ",76 This booklet intended to establish standards
which were to be followed by manufacturing companies and their au-
ditors.77 A debate between the fledging audit profession and the fed-
eral government developed as both sides attempted to persuade the
other as to who was better qualified to establish standards for the au-
dit profession. The debate was settled in 1914 when the Federal Re-
serve Bank ("FRB") yielded its standard setting autholity to the
AiA, 78 thereby leaving the development of GAAP, 79 GAAS,80 and
75. Geiger, supra note 15, at 7, 10
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id.
78. The SEC clearly has the authority to establish accounting standards. See Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77s (West 2005); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West
2005); see also Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTAL OF SECURITIES REGULATION 190
(5th ed. 2004) (stating that "the [SEC] long chose to rely on the accounting profession to estab-
lish generally accepted accounting principles.").
79. See AU § 411.05 for an established hierarchy to be consulted when determining if a princi-
ple is "generally accepted." "[Tihe determination that a particular accounting principle is gener-
ally accepted may be difficult because no single reference source exists for all such principles."
Id. But see In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 573
(2002), where the court states that "[tihere are 19 different GAAP sources, any number of which
might present conflicting treatments of a particular accounting question. Thus GAAP are far
from being a canonical set of rules that will ensure identical accounting treatment of identical
transactions. Rather, GAAP tolerates a range of 'reasonable' treatments, leaving the choice
among alternatives to management." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
80. SAS no. 95 - Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS"), J. AcCoUNTANCY, Feb.,
28, 2002, at 83, 2002 WLNR 5094201 [hereinafter SAS no. 95], is comprised of the following 10
audit standards:
General Standards:
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate technical train-
ing and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be main-
tained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the examination and prepara-
tion of the report.
Standards of Field Work:
4. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised.
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the auditor's report, to the audit profession.81 Self-regulated and un-
supervised, the audit profession fashioned accounting standards, audit
standards, and an auditor's report to their liking.
The early 1900's was a period of dramatic change for the auditor.
During this period, the audit profession began to move beyond its his-
toric role of auditing for fraud to its new role of auditing on a test
basis.82 Test basis auditing meant that an auditor no longer examined
every transaction but, instead, selected representative financial sam-
ples upon which to base a judgment. This change in audit philosophy
was prompted in part by increasing demands from the business com-
munity for audit services. As a result, a lack of understanding devel-
oped between what auditors actually did and what the public
perceived the auditor was doing ("expectation gap"). The expectation
gap increased as more auditors moved from fraud auditing to test au-
diting while the public's expectation of the auditor's role remained
unchanged.
In addition, another more subtle change occurred. During the first
half of the twentieth century, accounting principles were primarily
characterized as principles only. However, as the decades unfolded,
5. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control as a basis for
reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant extent of the tests to which auditing
procedures are to be restricted.
6. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, observation,
inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial
statements under examination.
Standards of Reporting:
7. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance with
generally accepted principles of accounting.
8. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently observed in the cur-
rent period in relation to the preceding period.
9. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably ade-
quate unless otherwise stated in the report.
10. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the financial statements,
taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an
overall opinion cannot be expressed, reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where the
auditor's name is associated with financial statements the report should contain a clear-cut indi-
cation of the character of the auditor's examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is
taking.
81. There are generally four different species of auditor's opinion contained within the stan-
dard auditor's report. The four variants are an unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, a dis-
claimer opinion and an adverse opinion. The unqualified opinion is desired by all audit clients
because it is perceived to be a bill of clean health. A full review of the reasons for and uses of
the different opinions is beyond the scope of this work.
82. VINCENT M. O'REILLY ET AL., MONTGOMERY's AUDITING 1*9 (12th ed. 1998) [hereinaf-
ter MONTGOMERY's AUDITING]. "Gradually, American audits evolved into 'test audits' as pro-
cedures were adapted to rapidly expanding American business, which considered British-style
detailed checking of footings and postings too time-consuming and expensive." Id.
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accounting standards evolved from a principles only focus to a rules
based focus. This evolution in accounting standards was in direct re-
sponse to the demands of an increasingly complex economy and the
auditor's desire to minimize his exposure to the public. 83
Principles only accounting is characterized by reporting and disclos-
ing financial results based on broadly defined principles of accounting.
Proponents of this school argue that principles based accounting leads
to better disclosure. Opponents, however, argue that principles based
accounting requires increased reliance on the auditor's professional
judgment and that in its final analysis, principles based accounting is,
itself, subject to a higher degree of manipulation because it relies
heavily on interpretation. Examples of principle based standards in-
clude determining the impairment of a long-lived asset,84 or identify-
ing when revenue should be recognized. 85
In direct contrast, rules based accounting is characterized by sheer
technical compliance with a stated rule. Rules based accounting is de-
void of any meaningful consideration as to whether the financial infor-
mation reported is reasonably presented. As a consequence,
satisfying rules based accounting principles may bear little relation to
the substance of the underlying transaction. 86 Proponents of rules
based accounting argue that it leads to better comparability and pro-
vides certainty in financial reporting. Opponents, however, argue that
rules based accounting rewards financial engineering. Examples of
rules based accounting include lease accounting87 and stock based
83. "GAAP has increasingly become rules-rather than principles-based. In large part, this
may be due to the auditing profession's belief that IPAs (independent public accountants) can
successfully avoid being sued if they can show that their clients and they followed the rules."
Benston, supra note 14, at 1344.
84. SEC REPORT, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCI-
PLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, pt. II.B.iii, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbased-
stand.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2004) [hereinafter STUDY].
85. Under the accrual basis of accounting, revenue is recognized when the rights to receive
the revenue are fixed and determinable. In contrast, under the cash basis of accounting, revenue
is recognized when the cash is received by the company. Both policies are technically correct but
may result in significantly different financial statements.
86. A clear example would be the accounting treatment for stock options. The current ac-
counting standard, FASB Statement No. 123, permits a company to choose between two meth-
ods when valuing the cost of stock options. The first method, the intrinsic value method,
generally results in a lower value than the second and preferred standard, the fair value method.
The rules permit a company to minimize the economic cost of the stock options it issues.
87. When classifying a lease as a capital lease, it must meet one of four tests; two of which
contain strict percentage thresholds (75% and 90%). STUDY, supra note 84, pt. II.B.i.
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compensation, 88 which adhere to mechanical principles for purposes
of financial reporting and auditing.
As of this writing, there are over 150 accounting pronouncements,
some principles based and others rules based, which provide guidance
to both Management and the auditor on a how to record a particular
transaction for purposes of financial statement disclosure. All of these
pronouncements are asserted to be GAAP. Yet, despite the creation
of new accounting standards, the auditor's report has remained essen-
tially unchanged. The public, generally unaware how financial trans-
actions were being measured and recorded in the first place, continues
to read and rely upon the auditor's report without so much as a warn-
ing that the underlying accounting rules evolved from a principles
based to a rules based approach,8 9 or that the auditor's focus had
shifted from a fraud focus to a test basis.
In an attempt to resolve the continuing debate over accounting
principles, Congress commissioned an analysis of the accounting prin-
ciples used in the United States as part of the SOA reforms
("Study"). 90 The Study attempts to establish a harmonized approach
88. Id. The Study cites additional rules based standards (consolidation 50%, consolidation of
special purpose entities 3%, smoothing gains or losses on defined benefit plans - 10%). Id.
Stock based compensation presents an especially abusive example of rules based accounting
because by complying with the rules, a company can avoid disclosing to the investor the hidden
expense of the full compensation program. Indeed, it was partly through the use of rules based
accounting that Enron was able to manipulate its financial statements to be technically compli-
ant with GAAP but deceptively deficient to the public. As long as 3% of Enron's capital came
from a third party, the accounting rules permitted that the liabilities of a special purpose entity
can be kept off the consolidated financial statements.
89. The Cohen Commission Report provides that "[olne effect of using a standard report is
that as a person becomes familiar with its words, he tends to stop reading it each time he sees it.
He relies on his memory of what it says and his impression of what it means... The entire report
comes to be interpreted as a single, although complex, symbol that is no longer read." THE
COMM'N ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(1978) [hereinafter COHEN COMMISSION REPORT]. Consider whether the auditor's report has
risen to the level of a quasi-trademark such that its continued use by the audit profession and
good faith reliance by the public should subject the audit profession to legal exposure using
principles similar to deceptive advertising. The report came to be "known as the Cohen Com-
mission, after its chairman, Manuel C. Cohen." MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING, supra note 82, at
1.12.
90. Section 108(d) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides in relevant part that
[t]he Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial
reporting system of a principles-based accounting system. The study ... shall include
an examination of-
(i) the extent to which principles-based accounting and financial reporting exists in
the United States;
(ii) the length of time required for change from a rules-based to a principles-based
financial reporting system;
(iii) the feasibility of and proposed methods by which a principles-based system may
be implemented; and
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to establishing accounting standards and resolve the debate over the
accounting principles to be used by companies when reporting their
financial results and by auditors when evaluating the financial
statements. 91
The Study begins by examining how accounting standards were es-
tablished by the accounting profession and how they evolved over
time. The Study declares that the SEC "has the responsibility [in de-
veloping] accounting standards to be used by public companies. '92
This is "[d]espite the fact that the [SEC] has consistently looked to the
private sector for assistance" 93 in determining accounting standards.
The Study analyzes the history and development of the accounting
standards and its effect on users, companies, auditors, and the SEC.
Specifically, the Study examined the development and use of princi-
ples only and rules based standards. Favoring neither approach, the
Study "found that imperfections exist when standards are established
on either a rules based or principles only basis."'94
According to the Study, principles only standards are deficient be-
cause they ". . . provide little guidance or structure for exercising pro-
fessional judgment by preparers and auditors. ' 95 As a consequence, a
principles only standard requires "preparers and auditors to exercise
significant judgment in applying overly broad standards to more spe-
cific transactions and events .... "96 Additionally, a principles only
standard does "not provide a sufficient structure to frame [a] judg-
ment that must be made" 97 concerning the resolution of a specific is-
sue. Instead, the exercise of judgment by an auditor when
interpreting the various standards may lead to "retrospective interpre-
tational differences" 98 over the accounting principle and the possibil-
ity of increased litigation among auditors, clients, regulators, and the
public.
Next, the Study also found rules based standards deficient because
they "provide a vehicle for circumventing the intention of the [ac-
(iv) a thorough economic analysis of the implementation of a principles-based
system.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d).
91. See STUDY, supra note 84.
92. Id. pt. II.A.iv; see also Benston, supra, note 14, at 1325 (where the author comments that
"[t]he Securities Act of 1934 gave the SEC the authority to dictate both accounting and auditing
standards.").
93. STUDY, supra note 84, pt. II.A.iv.
94. Id. Exec. Summ
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. STUDY, supra note 84, pt. V.G.
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counting] standard." 99 The Study found that "rules-based standards
can provide a roadmap [for the] avoidance of the accounting objec-
tives inherent in the standards. Internal inconsistencies, exceptions
and bright-line tests reward those willing to engineer their way around
the intent of the standards."'100 Rulesbased standards are "not
representationally faithful to the underlying economic
[transaction] ."101
The Study rejected both principles only accounting and rules based
accounting standards in favor of a new standard, an "objectives-ori-
ented [standard]. ' '102 The Study concluded that both the principles
only approach and the rules based approach contained deficiencies in
determining the appropriate standards for reporting financial transac-
tions. 10 3 The Study concludes that an objectives-oriented standard
will result in improved transparency of the financial transactions and
lead to less reliance on judgment by the company and the auditor.10 4
The new objective-oriented standard contains the following charac-
teristics: It should "[b]e based on an improved and consistently ap-
plied conceptual framework; [c]learly state the accounting objective of
the standard; [p]rovide sufficient detail and structure so that the stan-
dard can be operationalized ... ; [m]inimize exceptions from the stan-
dard; [a]void use of percentage tests .... ,"o0 The Study recognizes
that "objective-oriented standards place greater emphasis on the re-
sponsibility of both management and auditors to ensure that the fi-
nancial reporting captures the objectives of the standard .... ,"106 The
goal of the objectives-oriented standard is to provide better disclosure
to the public (emphasis added). It is the Study's expectation that
"good companies [will be incented] to be more forthcoming in provid-
ing clear and transparent information to investors.' u0 7
Despite its ambitious undertaking to resolve accounting principles,
the Study's final recommendation and implementation will have little
influence on the behavior of the average investor. This is because the
current auditor's report continues to make only passing reference to
the GAAP and GAAS standards without fully alerting the reader
what these standards represent. The continued use of an audit report
99. Id. Exec. Summ.
100. Id.
101. Id. pt. I.C
102. Id. Exec. Summ
103. S-rUo', supra note 84.
104. Id.
105. Id. Exec. Summ
106. Id.
107. Id. pt. III.I.ii.
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that is poorly understood will perpetuate the public's misunderstand-
ing of the audit process. This lack of understanding by the public in
turn diminishes confidence and credibility in the auditor, the audit
process, and ultimately, in the capital markets, thereby frustrating the
overall purposes and goals of the '33 Act, the '34 Act and the SOA. If
the SOA's objective of "protecting investors and further[ing] the pub-
lic interest in ... audit reports" is to acquire a meaning beyond the
inner sanctum of auditors, CFO's and professional investors, then the
auditor's report needs to be rewritten so that concepts such as
GAAS, 10 8 GAAP, 10 9 materiality, and audit risk acquire a concrete
meaning for the average investor.
D. Enhanced reporting and frequency
Section 401 of the SOA enhances the periodic disclosure require-
ments with two meaningful changes. First, § 401 requires that public
companies who file their annual SEC report ". . . reflect all material
correcting adjustments that have been identified by a registered public
accounting firm in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles ...."110 Second, public companies are now required to
disclose in "each annual and quarterly financial report required to be
filed with the [SEC] . . .all material off-balance sheet transactions,
arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations), and
other relationships of the [company] ... that may have a material cur-
rent or future effect on financial condition . . ." of the company.111
The enhanced reporting rules of § 401 are a marked improvement
to the reporting structure formerly used by companies. Before § 401,
the public was not aware of the possible financial impact that either a
correcting adjustment or an off-balance sheet transaction may have on
the company. Technical compliance with GAAP rules made it possi-
ble for companies to present financial statements that were engi-
neered to comply with GAAP while simultaneously not disclosing the
108. GAAS provides the auditor with a fair degree of flexibility in designing the audit to be
performed. GAAS itself is vague because it does not mandate a quantum of evidence to be
examined or a procedure to be undertaken. Rather, it leaves the determination of these to the
auditor's professional judgment which can vary based on the auditor's experience and tolerance
level for risk, and can further vary based on the audit client's level of complexity.
109. GAAP gives management the various tools to use in reporting financial information.
Thus, in a perfect world, management chooses the accounting treatment and the auditor con-
firms whether or not the treatment is consistent with GAAP. Management may not be aware of
the alternative treatments and feeling the pressure to report profitable growth, may turn to the
auditor for help in choosing a treatment that will present the financial statements in a favorable
light.
110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(a)(i).
111. Id. § 401(a)(j) (emphasis added).
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substance of the underlying transaction. 112 Technical compliance with
GAAP also permitted auditors to opine, without further explanation,
that the financial statements were GAAP compliant. In the end, rules
based accounting made it possible for financial engineers to fabricate
a particular result without violating GAAP. Now, as a result of § 401,
users of financial statements are expected to gain a better understand-
ing of "material"'113 transactions or "off-balance sheet transactions"'"14
that affect the company.
However, despite this reform concerning enhanced periodic disclo-
sure, one must consider whether in this day of instant information,
data which may be as much as three months old, remains timely and
relevant to the public. Businesses do not expect their corporate man-
agers to wait 30, 60, or 90 days to receive financial information from
the company before responding to the competitive environment.
Therefore, is it reasonable to expect that the public to wait, in some
cases up to 90 days, for the issuance of quarterly financial reports
upon which to help them base an economic decision? Information
which is relevant to the average investor should be released immedi-
ately. If a continuum of disclosure were imagined, information which
is disseminated daily would arguably have the greatest value to the
public. I n stark contrast, information which is disseminated annually
would have the lowest value.
In order to make the enhanced disclosure rules more meaningful to
the public, the enhanced disclosure rules should be amended to in-
clude a requirement that public companies make available, their
monthly financial results. 115 This is justified on the basis that all of the
Fortune 500 companies have websites which can easily allow for in-
stantaneous posting by the company and easy access by the public to
monthly financial information. Managers at many publicly traded
companies receive financial information on a monthly basis, if not
more frequently. Auditors would benefit also from the monthly dis-
closure because they could identify interim audit procedures that may
become necessary sooner. The public could compare the monthly in-
formation to the reported quarterly information and, ultimately, to
the audited financial statements. The practice of issuing monthly op-
112. Indeed, it was Enron's technical compliance with a 3% GAAP standard that permitted it
to technically hide its off-balance sheet obligations while remaining in compliance with GAAP.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(a)(j).
114. Id.
115. The monthly operating results would include, at a minimum, a monthly balance sheet and
a monthly profit and loss statement.
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erating results should help surface reporting issues, as well as help in
preventing the manipulation of financial results.
Opponents of this proposal will argue that monthly financial infor-
mation is not yet finalized, its release may create undue reliance by
investors and assembling the information will create additional cost
and burden to the company. In response, it can be contended that the
information may be issued with a proper disclaimer indicating that it is
preliminary financial information and that such information is subject
to change. 116 Additionally, the administrative burden the company
will bear as a result of monthly distributions should be negligible given
that monthly financial statements are already created as a routine bus-
iness practice. 117
III. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING
A. History of the audit profession
The origins of auditing can be traced back to the ancient Egyptian,
Chinese and Greek civilizations. The ancient Egyptians used auditing
procedures to provide "independent checks ... [for] .. .recording of
tax receipts. ' 118 "The government accounting systems of the Zhao
Dynasty 1 9 in China included an elaborate budgetary process and au-
dits of all government departments." 120 In ancient Greece, public offi-
cials were generally distrusted and were, therefore, required to subject
themselves to an audit of the accounts. 121 Throughout these early
times, audits were performed primarily as a check upon public offi-
cials entrusted with public financial responsibilities and as a tool to
help maintain control of valued resources.
During the Middle Ages, auditing continued to be used as a tool for
control. According to one auditing textbook, "[t]he City of London
116. By its very nature, most items which are material will be obvious to the company. In the
few instances where the question of the materiality is in doubt, or not known, a disclaimer sur-
rounding the uncertainty of the item should suffice.
117. The social benefit of frequent disclosure cannot be sufficiently emphasized. An investor
should have the confidence that the company he owns is constantly monitoring and evaluating its
own system of internal controls. Additionally, the practice of releasing monthly information
further enhances the objectives of Section 302 of the SOA, which requires that the officers cer-
tify the quarterly and annual disclosures, by ensuring that the monthly information is not being
manipulated by a company.
118. BOYNTON, supra note 8, at 9.
119. The period of the Zhao Dynasty ran from 1122 B.C. to 256 B.C.
120. MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING, supra note 82, at 1.7
121. GEORGE J. COSTOUROS, CTR. FOR INT'L EDUC. AND RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING, Ac-
COUNTING IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF GREECE: A RESPONSE TO SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGES 77
(1979) ("[P]riests and priestesses [were also] subject to audit ....").
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was audited at least as early as the 1200s. ' 122 Additionally, audits con-
ducted during this period held "a hearing of the accounts" before the
public.123 "By the middle of the sixteenth century, auditors.., often
annotated the accounts they audited with the phrase 'heard by the
auditors undersigned.'-"124
Modern auditing was born in the 19th century during the Industrial
Revolution. 125 The separation of ownership of the company from the
management of the company fueled the evolution of auditing, as ab-
sentee owners126 sought to hold hired managers accountable for the
results of the enterprise.127 In similar fashion, the increase in trade
and expansion of economies from a regional to a national basis helped
form the evolving role of the auditor.
During the middle of the 19th century, American breweries and
steel companies were among the first companies to begin using the
services of an auditor.128 American companies initially engaged the
more experienced British auditors to conduct the audit.129 As the
economy grew and more investors entered the market, demand for
audits increased. Bankers also contributed to the growing role of the
auditor during this period "by requiring audit examinations" of their
debtors. 130 American companies increasingly sought the advice and
expertise of auditors. British auditors, seeing a new market opportu-
122. MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING, supra note 82, at 1.7.
123. Id. The practice of "hearing the accounts" originated during the days when few people
could read. This practice continued until the seventeenth century. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1*8, where the authors report that "[b]efore 1850, audits were a minor part of
an accountant's practice and were not performed routinely."
126. Corporate shareholders must demonstrate a "proper purpose" before they will gain ac-
cess to a corporations books and records. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.75 (West 2005),
where a shareholder must state a "proper purpose" before he will be granted the right to see his
corporations books and records. Consider whether the system of separating ownership of a cor-
poration from the management of a corporation was ever intended to keep the legal owners of
the company away from the auditors.
127. Absentee owners turned to the auditor to help detect and protect against employee
fraud. See 0. Roy WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING AND OTHER ASSUR-
ANCE SERVICES 8 (13th ed. 2001) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON].
128. PETER L. MCMICKLE & RICHARD G. VANGERMEERSCH, THE ACAD. OF ACCOUNTING
HISTORIANS, THE ORIGINS OF A GREAT PROFESSION 142 (1987).
129. Id. The authors also cite the observations of James T. Anyon, an English Bred CPA and
first treasurer of the American Association of Public Accountants that, "[t]he average account-
ant of that day 'lacked personality and impressiveness. He failed to convey to the businessman
the conviction that he was an expert in his profession, or that he was especially expert in any-
thing. He knew of his business in a simple elemental way but possessed few ideas and little or no
vision."' Id. at 141-42.
130. Id. at 142.
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nity, exported their services and helped established the early Ameri-
can auditing firms.131
During the first half on the 20th century, the American audit pro-
fession matured. The auditors' defining moment in American business
came soon after the stock market crash of 1929 when Congress en-
acted the '33 Act and '34 Act. Both Acts required the inclusion of an
auditor's report. Congress sought to restore confidence and tranquil-
ity in the capital markets by pressing the auditor, and the auditor's
report, into service on behalf of the American public. 132 Congress
perceived that the auditor possessed the necessary skill, independence
and judgment to evaluate a company's financial information and ex-
press his independent opinion through the auditor's report.
During the second half of the 20th century, the accounting profes-
sion continued to develop into the profession we recognize today.
Following the post World War II era, American businesses began to
expand from regional markets to national markets. Similarly, the au-
dit profession evolved from regional markets to national markets. In
particular, the last quarter of the 20th century witnessed unprece-
dented growth in American businesses and corporate combinations.
"M&A"'1 33 became a standard buzz-word in the legal and business
community. The auditing profession, itself a for-profit industry, was
not spared the relentless march toward increased profitability and effi-
ciency. The auditing profession itself went through a period of intense
competition and consolidation during the 1980's as the firms com-
peted for increased market share and revenue. The continuing pres-
sure to increase profits and remain competitive pressed the audit firms
to expand the scope of services from audit into other areas including
tax and consulting services. 134 The first tier national accounting firms
went from the Big Eight, then to the Big Six, then to the Big Five, and
finally to what is presently the Big Four.135
131. Early audit firms formed the American Accounting Association, a predecessor organiza-
tion to the FASB.
132. See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1959). Congress adopted a disclosure based system to help investors
evaluate securities. Congress required the inclusion of the auditor's report to provide investors
with objective evidence of an evaluation of management's assertions. (couldn't match with
source)
133. The abbreviation "M&A" means "merger and acquisition".
134. Cox, supra note 25, at 301, 310-11. The auditing "industry was dominated by a few na-
tional players - first the Big Eight, then the Big Five, and now the Final Four." Id. at 311. The
author also suggests the theory that the audit profession used audits as a "loss leader" to gain
entry in the "more competitive and extremely lucrative consulting segment." Id. at 312.
135. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 662 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002). "The "Big Five"
accounting firms are Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP,
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However, despite its noble veneer and dignified origins,136 the audit
profession suffered a shameful and shocking fall from grace as it
found itself in the middle of a financial scandal whose wake rippled
through the American economy.' 37 The ensuing financial disasters,
many created with the assistance of the audit profession, are now in-
delibly etched on the pages of American history. The once noble and
prestigious profession is now viewed by the public as an outlaw whose
unsuspecting weapon consisted of the very tool Congress selected on
two earlier occasions to restore the public trust, the auditor's report.
B. History, evolution and purpose of the auditor's report.
The origin of the modern auditor's report can be traced to late 19th
century British audit reporting practices. 138 British influence figured
prominently in the formation of early American audit reports. These
early American audit reports were referred to as "certificates" and, in
direct contrast to the current auditor's report, opined on the "accu-
racy" of the financial report. The following is a sample of an early
auditor's report issued between 1900 and 1920:139
We have audited the books and accounts of the XYZ Company for
the year ended December 31, 1915, and we certify that, in our opin-
ion, the above balance sheet correctly sets forth its position as of the
termination of that year, and that the accompanying profit and loss
account is correct.140
KPMG LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. For many years, the accounting industry was
dominated by eight national firms. In 1989, the "Big Eight" was reduced to six members with the
mergers of Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young into Ernst & Young and Touche Ross and
Deloitte Haskins & Sells into Deloitte & Touche. In 1998, the "Big Six" became the "Big Five"
as Price Waterhouse merged with Coopers Lybrand to become PricewaterhouseCoopers." Id.
The "Big Five" became the "Big Four" following the demise of the Arthur Andersen firm in
2002.
136. "Before professional organizations were formed, individuals who had strong reputations
for probity and financial experience made attestations." Benston, supra note 14, at 1330 n.17.
137. The Wall Street Journal published a table of companies with accounting irregularities.
The following is a brief synopsis of the table: Adelphia - allegedly failed to properly disclose $3.1
billion in loans and guarantees to its founder's family; Bristol-Meyers - allegedly inflated reve-
nues by as much as $1 billion through the use of sales incentives; Merck - improperly recorded
$12.4 billion in revenue that were never collected; Rite Aid - allegedly inflated revenue by $1.6
billion; Tyco International - created "cookie-jar" reserves and "spring loaded" earnings from
acquisitions by accelerating their pre-merger outlays. The complete table can be found at: HAR-
OLD S. BLOOMENTHAL SARBANES-OXLEY Acr IN PERSPECTIVE app. E (2002-2003 ed. 2002).
138. Geiger, supra note 15, at 7.
139. The "[s]tandardization of the report developed because many auditors' reports were con-
fusing." COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 72. Changes to the report over time
were made in part, as a defensive measure to counter the auditors' liability. See infra Part IV.
140. Geiger, supra note 15, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
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Early audit reports did not have a required format. Auditors had
considerable discretion to write their audit reports to accommodate
the circumstances. Variants of the early auditors' reports state that
the auditor "finds the [accounts] to be correct," that "the books and
accounts... are correctly prepared ... .,,141 The common characteris-
tic among these early reports is that they convey to the reader that
they "certify" the accounts and state that the information is "accu-
rate.' 1 42 A reader of an early auditor's report is led to the conclusion
that the financial information as reported is accurate. This is no
longer the case with the auditor's report currently in use today. 143
The first attempt by the federal government to standardize the audit
report occurred in 1917 when the Federal Reserve Board published its
bulletin, Uniform Accounting: A Tentative Proposal.1 44 In that bulle-
tin the FRB recommended that the audit report read as follows:
I have audited the accounts of Blank & Company for the period
from ... to ... and I certify that the above balance sheet and state-
ment of profit and loss have been made in accordance with the plan
suggested and advised by the Federal Reserve Board and in my
opinion set forth the financial conditions of the firm at ... and the
results of its operations for the period.145
The 1917 recommended audit report retained the reference to the cer-
tification of the financial statements, but eliminated any express refer-
ence to their accuracy.' 46 The audit profession believed this version of
the auditor's report was more responsive to the increasing needs of
the American business community. In addition, the audit profession
also believed that this report alerted "the ... reader [as to] .. .the
inexactness of the financial reporting process.' 47
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Before 1900, audits often included an evaluation of "all or almost all recorded transac-
tions" for a company. WHrTTINGTON, supra note 127, at 9. Today, audits are conducted on a test
basis, which simply means selecting a limited sample of transactions on a predetermined basis
and determining if the sample chosen is properly recorded.
143. The current text of the standard auditor's report does not opine on the accuracy of the
financial statements. Instead, the auditor's report opines that the financial statements "present
fairly." This notion of "presents fairly" is an interesting concept because reasonable minds will
differ as to when the financial statements "presents fairly" its results. The point at which finan-
cial information no longer "presents fairly" will differ based upon the judgment, experience, and
tolerance level of the auditor.
144. Geiger, supra note 15, at 12. The text of the FRB's publication was adopted from a
booklet published earlier by the American Institute of Accountants ("AIA"). Id.
145. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 13 (alteration in original).
[Vol. 4:1
2005] SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE AUDITOR'S REPORT 25
Seventeen years later, in 1934, the AIA published a pamphlet that
included a revised audit report.148 The auditor's report evolved into a
standard two paragraph format and included substantial changes from
its 1917 predecessor. The word "audit" was replaced by the word "ex-
amined" in the belief that this change better informed the public that
the auditor was not examining every single transaction nor verifying
every management assertion 149 presented. The word "certify" was
eliminated in an attempt to clarify that the audit report is not a
guarantee. 150
The revised 1934 standard auditor's report reads:
We have made an examination of the balance sheet of the XYZ
Company at December 31, 1933, and of the statement of income
and surplus for the year 1933. In connection therewith, we ex-
amined or tested accounting records of the company and other sup-
porting evidence and obtained information and explanations from
officers and employees of the company; we also made a general re-
view of the accounting methods and of the operating and income
accounts for the year, but we did not make a detailed audit of the
transactions.
In our opinion, based upon such examination, the accompanying
balance sheet and related statements of income and surplus fairly
present, in accordance with accepted principles of accounting consist-
ently maintained by the company during the year under review, its
position at December 31, 1933, and the results of its operations for
the year.' 51
The revised 1934 audit report added the phrase "fairly present, in
accordance with accepted principles of accounting"' 52 to the auditor's
report. To this day, this phrase is a source of continuing debate and
controversy over its intended meaning. Does the phrase "fairly pre-
sent" mean that (i) the financial statements fairly present the underly-
ing economic and (ii) the financial results of the company? Or, does
the phrase mean that the financial statements are technically GAAP
148. Id. at 15. The 1934 revised audit report was prompted in large measure in response to
the audit report at issue in Ultramares. Id. at 14. "Perhaps the Ultramares case will be the means
of bringing about a reform which will eliminate the words certify and certificate." Id. at 15.
149. One commentator has described management assertions as "The Auditor's Achilles'
Heel" because of "the auditors' penchant for undue reliance on [management's] representations
in lieu of gathering objective evidence." FELIX POMERANZ, THE SUCCESSFUL AUDIT, NEW
WAYS TO REDUCE RISK EXPOSURE AND INCREASE EFFICIENCY 85 (1992), Business One Irwin,
Homewood, Illinois; see also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), where the court criticized the auditor for being "too easily satisfied with glib answers" by
management in conducting its audit, suggesting that the auditor is duty bound to objectively
confirm answers offered by Management. Id.
150. Geiger, supra note 15, at 15.
151. Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 16.
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compliant notwithstanding the underlying economics? Whatever the
intended meaning, the public is not aware of the subtle distinction in
meaning. As a result, a segment of the public believed that the audi-
tor's report is a certification of a fact and not an expression of opinion
based upon professional judgment. 153
The AICPA recognized that there existed a misunderstanding be-
tween the public and the auditor concerning the objective and func-
tion of an audit (referred to as an "expectation gap"). In order to
remedy this misunderstanding, the AICPA formed the Commission on
Auditors' Responsibilities in 1974 ("Cohen Commission") to address
the apparent gap in understanding. The AICPA charged the Cohen
Commission with determining "whether a gap may exist' 54 between
what the public expects ... and what auditors can and should reasona-
bly [be] expect[ed] to accomplish. '155
Four years later, in 1978, the Cohen Commission issued its re-
port.156 The Cohen Commission concluded that an expectation gap
"does exist."' 157 It further concluded (a) "the principal responsibility
does not appear to lie with the users of financial statements," (b)
"users expectations are generally reasonable," 158 and (c) "the burden
of narrowing the gap between performance and expectations falls pri-
marily on [the] auditors."1 59 The Cohen Commission Report states
that "research suggests that many users misunderstand the auditor's
role and responsibilities, and the present standard report only adds to
the confusion. ' 160 The public is generally unaware ". . . of the limita-
tions of the audit function and ... confused about the distinction be-
tween the responsibilities of management and those of the auditor."'1 61
Ten years after the Cohen Commission issued its report the audit
profession, in 1988, revised and issued the following auditor's report
in response to the concerns identified by the Cohen Commission:
153. See generally Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So.2d 315 (Miss.
1987) (auditor's report is an expression of professional opinion).
154. COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at xi (emphasis added). It is interesting to
note that the Commission Report is couched in the tentative ("may exist") despite the continued
debate at that time (i.e. 1974 - 1978) within audit profession concerning the role and function of
the auditors.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at xii.
158. Id. The Cohen Commission report indicates that "many users [of financial statements]
appear to misunderstand the role of the auditor and the nature of the service he [provides]". Id.
(alteration in original).
159. COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at xii.
160. Id. at 171.
161. Id.
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Independent Auditor's Report
To the Board of Directors and Stockholders
ABC Company
We have audited the balance sheets of ABC Company at December
31, 20X2 and the related statements of income, retained earnings,
and cash flows for the years then ended. These financial statements
are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsi-
bility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on
our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards gen-
erally accepted in the United States of America. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of mate-
rial misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evi-
dence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial
statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting princi-
ples used and significant estimates made by management, as well as
evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe
that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of ABC Com-
pany at December 31, 20X2 and the results of their operations and
their cash flows for the years then ended, in conformity with ac-
counting principles generally accepted in the United States of
America.
Is! CPA firm (signed by audit engagement partner)
Date
The 1988 audit report attempts to address some of the concerns
raised by the Cohen Commission. However, it fails to correct the un-
certainties of the predecessor 1934 auditor report - uncertainties
which continue in use today. In particular, the revised auditor's report
fails to address the presence of audit risk, fails to speak to materiality,
or clarify the objective of an audit. 162 The reintroduction of the word
"audit" in the opening sentence of the revised auditor's report may
actually mislead the public into believing the audit is more compre-
hensive than an auditor would admit, thereby continuing, instead of
dissipating, the expectation gap. Additionally, the original misunder-
standing remains - namely, the lack of understanding concerning the
role of the auditor, the scope of the audit, and the limitations of the
auditor's report.
162. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992), where the California Supreme
Court states that "an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that ... can be
easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable accuracy. Rather, an audit report is a
professional opinion based on numerous and complex factors." Id. at 763 (citations omitted).
20051
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As currently drafted, the auditor's report, with its hidden implica-
tions,163 will continue to be understood only by a select group of indi-
viduals. This pool of individuals will continue to diminish with each
passing pronouncement issued by the AICPA unless the auditor's re-
port is reformed. The social costs of misunderstanding the auditor's
report can lead to devastating financial consequences for the public.
Individual bankruptcies and pension bailouts all have an individual
and a social cost. Now more than ever, understanding the auditor's
report, and its limitations, is of increasing importance as a growing
percentage of the public interact with the securities markets.
C. The auditing function and process1 64
Audits are intrusive, disruptive, and costly. Why then, do compa-
nies undergo an audit? 165 In the case of publicly held companies, au-
dits are conducted to comply with SEC requirements. 166 In the case
of closely held companies, audits are conducted to satisfy a demand
made by an investor, a bank, or a supplier.167 At a fundamental level,
there exists a question of trust - namely, whether the financial state-
ment representations made by management are genuine and credible.
Therefore, the underlying function of an independent audit is to reas-
sure investors, creditors, and suppliers that the financial statements
presented by Management are bona fide. 168
163. The meanings of "present fairly," "GAAP," "GAAS," "materiality," and "audit risk."
164. One commentator has described the auditing process as "a mix[ture] of judgment and
technique which may result in certain pitfalls." See Feinman, supra note 1, at 22 (2003).
165. Additional reasons for undergoing an audit include lowering the cost of capital, enabling
access to capital markets, and improving financial and operational controls. See BOYNTON,
supra note 8, at 47-48.
166. See 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2005) (establishing the audit requirements for publicly held
companies).
167. For example, investors or creditors generally require closely held companies to secure
audited financial statements as a condition to securing financing. JERRY R. STRAWSER & ROB-
ERT H. STRAWSER, AUDITING THEORY AND PRACTICE 1-4 (Dame Publ'ns, Inc. 8th ed. 1997).
However, consideration must be given to the fact that "[e]ven an unqualified audit report ...
does not guarantee that the financial statements are entirely accurate, that the client has not
committed fraud in their preparation, or that the company's financial past is a reliable predictor
of its future." Feinman, supra note 1, at 54.
168. Cohen Commission Report notes that
Because financial statements are one of the means used to evaluate its performance,
management may select and apply accounting principles that give a biased portrayal of
the entity's financial position and earnings. The auditor evaluates the appropriateness
of management's selection and application of accounting principles. The principal
value of the independent auditor's opinion on financial statements is that his judgment
is not influenced by self-interest in the measurement of the performance of the entity
presented in the statements.
COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14.
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Management of a corporation makes certain representations about
the financial status of the company through its financial statements.1 69
An investor, creditor, or supplier evaluating the performance of a
company will read the financial statements and learn the state of the
company's financial performance for a given period. A knowledgea-
ble investor, creditor, or supplier will also look to see whether an au-
dit report accompanies the financial statements. The presence of an
audit report suggests to the reader that the financial statements have
been evaluated by an independent auditor. The absence of an audi-
tor's report signals to most readers that the financial statements have
not been independently reviewed and, therefore, calls into question
whether the financial information is objectively presented.
1. Comprehension
Attorneys advising and counseling clients on the implications of the
SOA will be expected to possess a basic understanding of the auditing
function and the audit process.170 To comprehend the audit process,
the advising attorney must gain an appreciation of the following five
concepts - accounting, auditing, 71 audit evidence, audit risk, and ma-
teriality - as well as understanding how these concepts interrelate
within the context of an audit.
First, accounting can be described as the process of identifying,
measuring, recording, and reporting financial transactions affecting a
company. 172 Accounting is not an exact measurement of all the finan-
cial transactions affecting a company. Instead, accounting is a process
169. Within the audit community, a management representation is called a "management as-
sertion." Management asserts, through its financial statements, that (1) a financial transaction
has occurred, (2) the financial statements are complete, (3) the company has the rights or obliga-
tions indicated in its financial statements, (4) the financial transactions have been identified,
measured and recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and (5) all
relevant and material disclosures have been made. See WHITFINGTON, supra note 127, at 136.
170. For example, Section 303 of the SOA provides in relevant part that "[i]t shall be unlawful
for any officer or director of an issuer, , to take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce,
manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant engaged in the perform-
ance of an audit of the financial statements." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 303. What is the "action"
contemplated by Section 303? When is an auditor "engaged in the performance of an audit of
the financial statements? Or consider Section 404 of the SOA which may require an attorney to
advise his client whether the auditor's evaluation of management's self assessment of its internal
control structure is proper. Id. § 404.
171. This requires understanding that audits are conducted on a test basis (meaning, sampling
and extrapolating instead of examining 100% of the financial transactions), what auditing is, and
most importantly, what auditing is not.
172. See KIEsO, supra note 8, at 2, where the authors state that "[aiccounting may best be
defined by describing the three essential characteristics of accounting: (1) identification, mea-
surement and communication of financial information about (2) economic entities to (3) inter-
ested persons."
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of combining calculated assumptions and concrete facts to record and
report economic transactions affecting an entity for a specified period
of time. Management is allowed considerable discretion in selecting
among the alternate GAAP rules when preparing its financial state-
ments. 173 The public may not be aware of Managements discretion.
Second, auditing can be described as a process whereby an auditor
confirms the information reported by Management on the company's
financial statements. The audit process requires that the auditor re-
view the accounting principles selected by Management when prepar-
ing the company's financial statements and analyze selected financial
transactions to determine if the company's internal controls174 are
properly functioning. It is a fundamental tenet of auditing that Man-
agement, not the auditor, is responsible for the information reported
through the financial statements. An audit is not a guarantee of finan-
cial statement accuracy. 175 Instead, an audit is meant to provide rea-
sonable assurance, as distinguished from absolute assurance, that the
financial information presented is reasonably accurate and that the
financial statements are free from material misstatement.
Third, the theory of "audit evidence" requires understanding that
an auditor need only obtain "sufficient competent evidential mat-
ter" 176 during the performance of the audit to enable the auditor to
evaluate the evidence and to form an opinion regarding the financial
statements. 177 Typical audit procedures used by auditors include
173. For example, management has the discretion to choose which inventory method (Last-in,
First out (LIFO), First-in, First-out (FIFO), weighted average or specific identification), or de-
preciation method (straight line depreciation, declining balance depreciation, sum of the year's
digits) to adopt. The method selected will ultimately have a considerable impact on the earnings
reported to investors. Management may also use bunching, acceleration or deferral techniques
for either income or expense items with the objective of improving the financial results reported.
174. See STRAWSER, supra note 164, at 4-2, where the authors define internal controls as "[a]n
entity's.., policies and procedures implemented by management to ensure that transactions are
recorded accurately and that assets are adequately safeguarded."
175. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979), where the Ninth
Circuit recognized that "an accountant is not a guarantor of the reports he prepares and is only
duty bound to act honestly, in good faith and with reasonable care in the discharge of his profes-
sional obligations." Id.
176. SAS no. 95, supra note 80, item number 6.
177. Most individuals' experience with an audit comes within the context of an income tax
audit where a tax auditor has the authority to examine every single line item and scrutinizing
every single document if necessary. In point of fact however, financial audits differ from tax
audits because of differing objectives. The objective of a financial audit is to determine if the
financial statements reasonably reflect the company's underlying financial performance. In
sharp contrast, the objective of a tax audit is to ensure that taxpayers are properly reporting
income and complying with the prescribed rules governing deductions and credits. Thus, the
level of detail necessary and scrutiny required will vary between a tax audit and a financial audit.
Consider also, First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th
Cir. 1990), where the court recognizes that
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"physical examination, re-performance, retracing, documentation,
confirmation, analytical procedures, interviews and observation. ' '178
An auditor is not required to evaluate every single financial transac-
tion affecting a company when conducting an audit. Doing so would
be cost prohibitive and of marginal benefit to the company and its
shareholders. 179
Fourth, the concept of "audit risk" 180 requires understanding that
there exists the possibility that that the auditor may unintentionally
issue the wrong audit opinion.181 For example, the auditor may issue
an unqualified opinion (that is, a clean opinion) 182 when the circum-
stances dictate that he should have issued a qualified opinion or a dis-
claimer opinion.
Fifth, "[t]he concept of materiality recognizes that [the disclosure
of] some matters. . .are important for [the] fair presentation of [the]
financial statements in conformity with [GAAP]."'18 3 The materiality
The situation is complicated by the fact that the interests of management, the financiers
of the work product, are not necessarily consonant with those of the public. Manage-
ment seeks to maximize stockholders' and creditors' confidence in the company, within
the bounds of the accounting profession's Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS); whereas, the public
demands a sober and impartial evaluation of fiscal performance.
Id.
178. WILLIAM F. MESSIER, AUDITING A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH, THE MCGRAw HILL COM-
PANIES, INC. 117 (1997).
179. The costs of conducting and reporting a 100% audit would outweigh the benefits. Con-
sider the question, "what will result in a better audit?" Improved audit procedures? Enhanced
audit disclosure? A more thorough audit will not necessarily result in a better audit. The real
objective to be accomplished through the auditor's report is to provide the public with relevant
information to help in the decision process. If the auditor's report alerts the public to the scope
and limitations of the audit, then the public will adjust its expectations and reliance accordingly.
180. AU § 312.02 defines audit risk as "the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail to
appropriately modify his or her opinion of financial statements tat are materially misleading."
Audit risk itself is the sum of three discrete risk components: inherent risk ("[t]he possibility of a
material misstatement of an assertion before considering the client's internal control" environ-
ment), control risk ("[t]he risk that a material misstatement will not be prevented or detected on
a timely basis by the client's internal control" environment) and detection risk ("[t]he risk that
the auditors will fail to detect [a material] misstatement with their audit procedures."). See
WHrIrINGTON, supra note 127, at 137. What is of peculiar note is that the audit profession
appears to have found a way to objectively calculate what otherwise would appear to be wholly
subjective determinations. See BovroN, supra note 8, at 293.
181. It is important to bear in mind that the auditor's "opinion", in contrast to the auditor's
"report", is a statement of professional opinion made by the auditor within the body of the
auditor's report regarding the type of opinion he expresses (e.g., "present fairly," "except for,"
"subject to").
182. See In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., Sec. Litig., 277 F.3d 658, 663 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002),
where the court states that "[a]n 'unqualified' or 'clean' audit opinion is the highest level of
assurance that an auditor can give on an organization's financial statements. Accountants will
'qualify' their opinion where discrepancies are identified in a client's financial statements." Id.
183. AU § 312.03.
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doctrine functions as a screening mechanism to help the auditor deter-
mine when the disclosure of an item is required so that the financial
statements are not distorted or misleading. To satisfy the materiality
requirement, an auditor is required to plan the audit in order to detect
transactions that may have a material effect on the financial state-
ments.18 4 The auditor is required to establish "materiality levels" to
help him decide when an item is to be considered material to the fi-
nancial statements.185
The auditing standards do not establish a percentage level for deter-
mining when a transaction is to be considered material. The absence
of quantitative levels for evaluating materiality is consistent with the
SEC's own position on materiality which prohibits the use of quantita-
tive presumptions when evaluating materiality thresholds.186 Compre-
hending how an auditor approaches materiality is now of increasing
importance to the lawyer because the SOA itself mandates due con-
sideration of materiality under certain provisions.
FASB Concepts Statement No. 2 provides the auditor with general
guidance in determining when an item is to be considered material. It
provides that an item is to be treated as material when "the [impor-
tance] of an omission or misstatement of accounting information...
makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on
the information would have been changed or influenced by the omis-
sion or misstatement."' 187 The auditor must consider "the magnitude
of an omission or misstatement of accounting information that, in light
of the surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the judg-
ment of a reasonable person relying on the information would have
been ... influenced by the omission or misstatement.' 188 While the
audit standards do not prescribe quantitative guidelines for determin-
ing materiality threshold levels, certain industry "[r]ules of thumb...
[have evolved when establishing materiality levels which] ... include
5% to 10% of net income before taxes, 1h percent to 1 percent of total
assets, and 1 percent of total equity."'189
184. See BOYrON, supra note 8, at 286 (citing STAMFORD CoNN, QUALITATIVE CHARACTER-
ISTICS OF ACCOUNTING, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS XV (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2nd ed., 1980)).
185. See STRAWSER, supra note 164, at 4-14.
186. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Release SAB 99, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (Aug. 12 1999).
187. AU § 312.10
188. AU § 312.10
189. WHITTINGTON, supra note 127, at 194; see also BoYNTON, supra note 8, at 287 (5% to
10% of net income before taxes); KiEso, supra note 8, at 50 (stating that "Companies and their
auditors for the most part have adopted the general rule of thumb that anything under 5% of net
income is considered not material.").
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To fully grasp the notion of materiality within an audit context, one
must recall that the accounting process is itself an inexact process.
Accounting involves, to varying degrees, measuring and recording fi-
nancial transactions through the use of estimates. 190 One must also
recall that the auditor is reviewing the financial statements prepared
by the company, not preparing them. Therefore, the notion of materi-
ality becomes increasingly important when the item under considera-
tion, if omitted or misstated, would substantially distort the financial
statements. Establishing whenan item will be considered material "is
a matter of professional judgment and is influenced by [the auditor's]
perception of the needs of a reasonable person who will rely on the
financial statements."1 91
An auditor uses materiality as a financial yardstick to help deter-
mine whether an economic transaction, or a series of transactions or
accounts, requires disclosure in the financial statements. The transac-
tion generally involved is typically an accounting omission or account-
ing restatement. If, in an auditor's judgment, an item is deemed to
have a material impact than the auditors will require a disclosure in
the financial statements. Depending on the type of item, the disclo-
sure may require adjusting the financial statements to reflect the eco-
nomic impact of the considered item. 92 Conversely, if an item is not
deemed to have a material financial impact, then the auditors will not
require an adjustment to the financial statements. Auditors may dis-
regard the financial effects of a particular transaction if in the audi-
tor's judgment, the omission or correction of the transaction is not
material to the information reported on the financial statements taken
as a whole. 193
190. See DONALD A. LESLIE, MATERIALITY: THE CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION TO AUDIT-
ING 8 (Canadian Inst. of Chartered Accountants ed., 1985), where the author describes the "ac-
counting process ... a collection of estimates and predictions."
191. AU § 312.10 (emphasis added).
192. Certain adjustments may simply take the form of a footnote disclosure (e.g. non-financial
items such as a related party transaction.)
193. By way of example, a discrepancy of $1 million dollars may not be material to the finan-
cial statements of many Fortune 500 companies and therefore, may not require adjusting the
financial statements of such company. Thus, whether something is characterized as material
from a quantitative perspective, depends on its context within the financial statements and the
auditor's tolerance level for materiality. From an audit perspective as distinguished from an
investor perspective, materiality has little meaning without financial statements against which to
measure. Therefore, the statement within the auditor's report that the "financial statements...
present fairly... in all material respects" has minimal value to the public, because without a
known published standard against which to measure, any such reference to materiality is a pure
abstraction absent of any significant meaning to the public. See complete text of auditor's report
infra Part III.B.
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What is considered material is ultimately a matter of the auditor's
professional judgment. The challenge for regulators, auditors and
lawyers following the enactment of the SOA, will be to arrive at a
universal definition of materiality. Several newly adopted provisions
of the SOA require the disclosure of material items.194 Conflicts will
inevitably arise between regulators, auditors, Management, and the
public as each party will seek a definition that advances its own inter-
est. At present, there is no case clearly defining what "materiality"
means within the context of the auditor's report. However, two Su-
preme Court cases which analyzed the meaning of materiality within
the context of the securities laws may be instructive.
a. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.195
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., a minority stockholder
brought suit against the defendants claiming that the defendants' joint
proxy statement was incomplete and materially misleading in viola-
tion of §14(a) of the '34 Act' 96 and Rules 14a-3a' 97 and 14a-9.198 The
194. Section 401(a) adds two new subsections to 15 U.S.C. § 78, which both rely heavily on the
interpretation of the term "material." Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(a). New subsection (i), cap-
tioned "Accuracy of Financial Reports," provides that "[e]ach financial report that contains fi-
nancial statements . . . shall reflect all material correcting adjustments . . . identified by a
registered public accounting firm .. " Id. § 401(a)(i). In addition, Section 401(a) adds the
requirement that is in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and the rules
and regulations of the Commission. New subsection (j), captioned "Off-Balance Sheet Transac-
tions," provides in relevant part that
[n]ot later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
the Commission shall issue final rules providing that each annual and quarterly finan-
cial report required to be filed with the Commission shall disclose all material off-bal-
ance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obligations),
and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that
may have a material current or future effect on financial condition, changes in financial
condition, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, capital resources, or sig-
nificant components of revenues or expenses.
Id. § 401(a)(j) (emphasis added).
195. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
196. Id. at 441 n.2. Section 14(a) provides in relevant part that
[it shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or
otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to section 78L of this title.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2005)).
197. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3 (1975).
198. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1975). Rule 14a-9 provides that
[n]o solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy state-
ment, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral, con-
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plaintiff in this case was required to exchange his stock following a
merger transaction. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants "omitted
[disclosing in] the proxy statement [certain] material facts relating to
the degree of ... control"'199 they exercised over the acquired com-
pany. The plaintiffs also claimed the defendants withheld material in-
formation by failing "to state in the proxy statement that the transfer"
of the minority shareholder's interest to the majority shareholder had
given the defendant control over the acquired entity.20° The plaintiffs
also claimed that the defendants withheld material information by
failing to disclose the favorable terms of their acquisition.201
The Court framed its inquiry into its analysis of the materiality con-
cept by stating that "[t]he question of materiality ... is an objective
one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to
a reasonable investor. '20 2 The Court examined the contrasting formu-
lations of the materiality standard proposed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals against the standard proposed by the Second and
Fifth Circuits. The Seventh Circuit standard articulated a broad ap-
proach to materiality and declared that "material facts include 'all
facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider important."' 20 3
In contrast, the Second and Fifth Circuits articulated a narrower stan-
dard and adopted an inquiry-based approach in defining materiality,
namely, "whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the
fact misrepresented or omitted in determining his course of action. '20 4
The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit standard. The Court ex-
plained that adopting a standard that is so broad may lead to the dis-
closure by the company of "information [that] is of . . . dubious
significance .... ,,205 By setting the
standard of materiality... unnecessarily low, not only may the cor-
poration and its management be subjected to liability for insignifi-
cant omissions or misstatements, but also management's fear of
exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the
taining any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
Id. §240.14a-9(a).
199. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 442.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 442-43.
202. Id. at 445.
203. Id. (Emphasis in original.)
204. Id.
205. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448.
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shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decision making.2°6
Thus, too low a threshold for materiality might cause information
overload.
The Court then articulated a materiality standard and declared that
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider [the omitted fact] important in
deciding how to vote. ' 20 7 The Court further stated that "there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signifi-
cantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available. '20 8 This
latter requirement helps safeguard against frivolous claims that infor-
mation which is of dubious significance is material.
b. Basic Inc. v. Levinson20 9
Twelve years later, the United States Supreme Court once again ex-
amined the question of materiality in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. This
time, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of a materiality
within a pre-merger context under §10(b) of the '34 Act 210 and Rule
10b-5.211 At issue in Basic was whether the defendant's intentional
misstatements denying pre-merger discussions were materially
misleading.
The plaintiffs in Basic brought an action under the '34 Act claiming
that "the defendant issued three false or misleading public state-
ments" in violation of §10(b) and of Rule 10b-5. '212 The plaintiffs
alleged that they sustained economic injury as a result of selling their
stock at an artificially depressed price.213 The plaintiffs' claim that
they relied on the defendant's intentionally misleading statements
which denied that pre-merger discussions were in progress. 214 "Dur-
206. Id. at 448-49.
207. Id. at. 449.
208. Id.
209. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 provides in relevant part that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange... to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they where made, not misleading .
Id.
212. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.
213. Id. at 228.
214. Id. at 227.
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ing 1977 and 1978, the defendant made three public statements deny-
ing that it was engaged in merger negotiations. '215 In November
1978, the defendant went so far as to issue to its shareholders financial
statements for the nine month period ending September 30, 1978, re-
porting that "[w]ith regard to the [surge in] stock market activity in
the Company's shares, we remain unaware of any present or pending
developments which would account for the high volume of trading
and price fluctuations in recent months."' 216 On December 18, 1978,
the defendant suspended "trading in its shares and issued a release
stating it had been 'approached' by another company concerning a
merger. '217 Two days later, on December 20, the defendant "publicly
announced its approval of the ... tender offer for all outstanding
shares.1"218
The Court's analysis reiterated that the purpose of the '34 Act is "to
protect investors against manipulation of stock prices" 219 and that a
key objective of the '34 Act is to "implement[ ] a philosophy of full
disclosure." 220 The Court cautioned that the policy of full disclosure is
not tantamount to a paternalistic view of investors. 221 Rather, the pol-
icy is meant to provide investors with information to make an in-
formed decision. 222 The Court then reaffirmed its earlier standard for
materiality.223 The Court held that it "expressly adopt[s] the... stan-
dard of materiality" announced in TSC for purposes of §10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 224 The Court further clarified that "materiality depends
on the significance the reasonable investor would place on the with-
held or misrepresented information. '225
As the case law demonstrates, the Supreme Court's approach to
materiality is conceptually similar to the auditor's notion of material-
ity. When evaluating the relative importance of a material item, both
the Supreme Court and the GAAS materiality standards make refer-
ence to the omitted or misstated fact,226 both refer to an "objective"
215. Id.
216. Id. at 227 n.4.
217. Id. at 227-28.
218. Basic, 485 U.S. at 228.
219. Id. at 230.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 234.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 232.
224. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232.
225. Id. at 240.
226. The Supreme Court uses "an omitted fact;" the audit standards use "an omission or mis-
statement." See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.
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standard, 227 and both purport to assess the degree of influence the
omitted fact would have had on the investor 228 as relevant factors to a
materiality inquiry.
The challenge following the enactment of the SOA is reconciling
the practical differences when applying the materiality standard. "Ac-
countants have generally viewed the materiality doctrine as a mecha-
nism that protects corporate clients and themselves against their own
mistakes and not as a concept that facilitates a full disclosure system
for the protection of investors. '229 A leading textbook on auditing
theory asserts that "materiality represents a cushion that the auditor
allows for the necessary imprecision in applying auditing procedures
to detect misstatements of the financial statements. '230 In stark con-
trast, the SEC pursues a policy of full disclosure when interpreting
materiality in order to expand its enforcement powers and to protect
the public interest. Reconciling both approaches will be even more
important given that the SEC now has direct oversight responsibility
over the audit profession and the auditor's report.
IV. CASE LAW ANALYSIS AND APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
The question of responsibility and liability is intensely debated in
any profession. However, the auditor may find himself legally ex-
posed to a broader group of plaintiffs who will claim to have relied to
their detriment on the auditor's report simply by issuing the audit re-
port. The distinguishing characteristic of the auditor's report, when
compared to other professionally issued reports, is that the auditor's
report is widely distributed. The auditor's report, therefore, can influ-
ence the decisions of a vast group of individuals whether they lay in
the comfort of their bedroom or sit in a boardroom. 231
The AICPA, recognizing the social responsibility and public influ-
ence the auditor exerts, pronounced that:
[a] mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility to the
public. The accounting profession's public consists of clients, credit
grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and finan-
cial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity
227. The Supreme Court uses "reasonable shareholder;" the audit standards use "reasonable
person." See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.
228. The Supreme Court uses "would consider;" the audit standards use "influenced." See
Basic, 485 U.S. at 231.
229. Warren, supra note 27, at 899.
230. Id. at 899-900.
231. See STRAWSER, supra note 164, at 1-4. "Three major groups of individuals are involved in
the audit process: (1) the entity whose financial statements are being evaluated (the client), (2)
the auditor, and (3) third-party users." Id.
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of certified public accountants to maintain the orderly functioning
of commerce. This reliance [by the public on auditors] imposes a
public interest responsibility on certified public accountants. 232
One audit textbook, quoting a FASB pronouncement, states that
"[t]he social purpose that independent audits serve[ ] ... enhance the
reliability or credibility" of the financial information presented. 233
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a frequently quoted opinion, also rec-
ognized the social value of the auditor and stated that:
[b]y certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corpora-
tion's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public re-
sponsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to investing public. This "public watchdog"
function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust.234
The ability to affect and influence vast number of individuals trans-
lates into a near infinite range of possible legal actions against the
auditor ranging from claims made by the audit client to claims made
by unknown third parties.
Auditors are directly liable to their audit clients235 under contract
and tort theories.236 In certain circumstances, auditor liability has ex-
tended from the audit client to third parties. The typical fact pattern
232. 2 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS § 53.01 (1990). But see Waters v. Autuori, 676
A.2d 357 (Conn. 1996), where the issue under consideration was "whether the promulgation of
professional accounting standards is sufficient, by itself, to impose upon the promulgating pro-
fessional organization a duty of care to an unknown third party who relies on the opinion of a
certified public accountant claiming to have followed those standards." Id. at 358. The Connect-
icut Supreme Court examining this issue held that "the standards promulgated by the AICPA
are, on their face, insufficient to establish a duty of care" to an unknown third party. Id. at 361.
Thus, even though the AICPA acknowledges that it has a duty to protect the public, courts seem
to be reluctant to find that a duty exists.
233. MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING, supra note 82, at 1*12 (quoting the Financial Accounting
Standards Board in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, Objectives of Financial
Reporting By Business Enterprises).
234. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). But see Bily v. Arthur
Young, 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992), where the California Supreme Court maintains that "[a]n
auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound."
235. Justice Cardozo stated that auditors "owed to their employer (i.e. the audit client) a duty
imposed by law to make their [audit] certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of con-
tract to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
236. An aggrieved audit client can resort to two immediately available legal theories in its
claim against the auditor. The first theory is for a breach of contract. Specifically, the client will
assert that the auditor breached one of its express or implied promises and as a result of its
breach, caused a harm to the audit client. The second theory available to the audit client is a tort
action for either negligence, misrepresentation or gross negligence.
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concerning an audit dispute between an auditor and a third-party in-
volves a conflict that arises after the third-party loses money on an
investment in the audited company as a result of a relying on the audi-
tor's report. The third-party, typically an investor, creditor or sup-
plier, claims to have relied on the auditor's report accompanying the
financial statements, and will have advanced money or supplies to the
audited company. Eventually, the audited company declares bank-
ruptcy. The third-party invariably asserts a claim against the auditor
in an attempt to recover his lost investment. Three schools of third-
party auditor responsibility have evolved: the privity standard, the Re-
statement approach, and the foreseeable user approach.
A. The Privity Standard
The first school of third-party auditor liability holds that an auditor
is liable only to persons in privity of contract. The first school of
third-party auditor liability, the privity approach, was initially an-
nounced in 1932 by Justice Cardozo in Ultramares Corp v. Touche.237
The auditor in Ultramares conducted an audit of the financial state-
ments of Fred Stern & Company.238 The plaintiff was "engaged in
business as a factor"239 and routinely relied on an auditor's report in
conducting its business. As a condition to extending credit to the au-
dit client, Fred Stern & Company, the plaintiff "insisted that it receive
a balance sheet certified by public accountants. ' '240 The Stern Com-
pany delivered an audit certificate prepared by the auditor to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, relying on the auditor's certificate, made a se-
ries of loans to the company.241
The balance sheet for the Stern Company showed a healthy com-
pany.242 However, it was eventually discovered that false entries were
237. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441.
238. Id. at 442.
239. Id. at 443. A "factor" is a business entity that purchases another company's accounts
receivable in exchange for an immediate discounted cash payment.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. The balance sheet for Ultramares reads:
'TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO.
'Public Accountants
'Eighty Maiden Lane
'New York
'February 26, 1924.
'Certificate of Auditors
'We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the year ending Decem-
ber 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed balance sheet is in accordance there-
with and with the information and explanations given us. We further certify that,
subject to provision for Federal taxes on income, the said statement in our opinion,
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posted to the accounts to create the impression of a strong com-
pany.243 The auditor's sparse audit procedures failed to detect the
false entries. 244 The accounts receivable, inventory and accounts pay-
able examined by the auditors turned out to be incorrect.245 As a re-
sult, the balance sheet, certified by the auditor as "true and correct"2 46
turned out to be incorrect. The Stern Company declared bankruptcy
on January 2, 1925.247 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs brought suit
against the auditors, Touche Niven & Company, for negligence and
fraud.248
Justice Cardozo held that the auditor did not owe a duty of care to
the plaintiffs. Therefore, the auditor could not be held liable for negli-
gence.249 Justice Cardozo reasoned that "[i]f liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose account-
ants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. '250 According to Justice Cardozo, only
a party in privity with the auditor could assert a negligence claim
against the auditor.25' Ultramares became an almost impenetrable de-
fense that was successfully used by auditors against third-party plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for damages caused by an auditor's negligent
audit.
B. Restatement Approach
The second school of third-party auditor liability holds that an audi-
tor is liable to a third-party if he negligently or falsely supplies infor-
mation to a third-party. This approach emerged with the introduction
of § 552 of the Restatements (Second) of Torts, § 552 ("Restate-
presents a true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as at
December 31, 1923.
'TOUCHE, NIVEN & CO.,
'Public Accountants.'
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 243 N.Y.S. 179, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930) (emphasis added), rev'd,
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
243. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
244. Id.
245. There was a fictitious accounts receivable posting of $706,000.00. Ultramares p 190
246. See language in the audit opinion where the auditors assert that the balance sheet
"presents a true and correct view." Ultramares, 243 N.Y.S. at 183 (emphasis added).
247. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 443.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 444-47.
250. Id. at 444.
251. Id.
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ment") in 1977.252 The Restatement sought to reconcile the compet-
ing goals of protecting auditors against the hazard of indeterminate
liability while at the same time providing audit plaintiffs with relief
from the privity standard declared in Ultramares. Section 552 of the
Restatement provides the general rule that one who negligently sup-
plies false information for the use of another person in his business is
liable for losses caused to such person as a result of that person's reli-
ance on the information.25 3 The Restatement limits the auditor's lia-
bility to the person, or a limited group of persons, for whom the
information is intended to benefit. 254 The Restatement requires that
the information supplied to such person, actually influence the deci-
sion of the person and cause the person to rely on the information as a
condition to finding an auditor liable to a third-party.255
Twenty-two jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement stan-
dard.256 The most notable adoption of the Restatement position is the
California's Supreme Court opinion in Bily v.Arthur Young &Com-
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Section
552, Information Negligently Supplied For The Guidance of Others, reads as follows:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the gui-
dance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it;
and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influ-
ence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any
of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Jessica P. Gomez, Accountants' Accountability to Non Clients in Texas, St. Mary's
Law Journal, (2003), The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 is followed by twenty-two states
including: Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. Paul J. Masinter &
Walter F. Wolfe, Non-Client Third Party Claims Against Accounting Firms, Network (ABA/Bus.
Law Section), Spring 2002, at 3, 5, available at http:// www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/newsletter/0003/
materials/tipl.pdf (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal). Mississippi and Wisconsin are the
states that currently utilize the foreseeability standard. Id. Courts and legislatures in Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota, U.S. Virgin Islands, and
Vermont apparently have not tackled this issue and thus their standard remains unclear.
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pany.25 7 The California Supreme Court also used Bily to engage in a
critical examination concerning the scope of an auditor's liability to a
third party.
Bily involved an action by a group of investors who relied on the
auditor's report when making an investment in the Osborne Com-
puter Corporation ("Osborne"). 2 58 Osborne was founded in 1980 at
the start of the personal computer revolution.2 59 Osborne began ship-
ping computers in 1981, and by fall of 1982, its sales soared to $10
million per month.2 60 In anticipation of a financing transaction the
company needed, Osborne retained Arthur Young & Company ("Ar-
thur Young") to audit its financial statements for 1981 and 1982.261
Arthur Young prepared and issued "100 sets" of unqualified audit re-
ports.2 62 The auditor's report accompanying the Osborne financial
statements for 1981 and 1982 opined that Osborne's financial "state-
ments 'presented fairly' the company's financial position. '263
Relying on the audited financial statements, the Bily plaintiffs pur-
chased financial warrants in Osborne to help it secure bridge financing
early in 1983.264 By mid-1983, Osborne began experiencing produc-
tion problems and increased competition.265 As a result, its sales be-
gan to lag. The company filed for bankruptcy protection on
September 13, 1983.266
The Bily plaintiffs filed suit against Arthur Young alleging "fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and professional negligence. 2 67 Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs alleged that Arthur Young failed to conduct its au-
dit examination in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards, that liabilities for the audited period had been understated
by $3 million dollars and that "[a]s a result ... [the reported] $69,000
operating profit [for 1982] was . . . [really] a[n operating] loss of $3
million. '268 The Bily plaintiffs also charged that Arthur Young failed
to report material weaknesses in the company's internal controls to
management. 269
257. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
258. Id. at 748.
259. Id. at 747.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
264. Id. at 747.
265. Id. at 748.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
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Following a 13-week trial, the jury "exonerated Arthur Young with
respect to the allegations of intentional fraud and negligent misrepre-
sentation, but returned a verdict . .." finding Arthur Young liable of
"professional negligence. '270 The California Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's finding of professional negligence. 271 How-
ever, the California Supreme Court, citing Restatement § 552,
reversed and held that the auditor could not be found liable for
negligence. 272
The court held that "an auditor's liability for general negligence in
the conduct of an audit of its client financial statements is confined to
the client, i.e., the person who contracts for or engages the audit ser-
vices. '273 The California Supreme Court reasoned that "[u]nder the
Restatement rule, an auditor retained to conduct an annual audit and
to furnish an opinion for no particular purpose generally undertakes
no duty to third parties. Such an auditor is not informed 'of any in-
tended use of the financial statements;' 274 This reasoning echoes the
Restatement's requirement that an auditor be placed on notice before
he can be found liable to a third-party.
One might argue that the auditing profession, through its literature,
its pronouncements, and its studies, is fully aware of the power and
influence its audit report has on the general public. Is it reasonable
then, for an auditor to continue to market himself as a "public watch-
dog," while at the same time maintain the claim that he did not intend
to influence the economic decision of a third party?
The Restatement's approach is troubling because, while the auditor
may not know the third-party whom he is influencing, he is nonethe-
less aware that his report may influence a decision of a third-party
who relies on the auditor's report. One might argue that the auditing
profession, through its literature, its pronouncements, and its studies,
is fully aware of the power and influence its audit report has on the
general public. Is it reasonable then, for an auditor to continue to
market himself as a "public watchdog" while at the same time main-
tain the claim that he did not intend to influence the economic deci-
sion of a third party? As one commentator observes, "the
Restatement standard reflects the accountant's responsibility to those
beyond the direct client, but does not protect the general public from
270. Id. at 749. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $4.3 million in compensatory damages. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 774.
273. Id. at 767.
274. Bily, 834 P.2d at 758.
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the accountant's negligence. '275 Requiring a plaintiff to prove that an
auditor "intend[ed] to supply the information" to the plaintiff and to
also prove that the information "influenced" an economic decision
places a crushing burden on plaintiffs seeking recovery from negligent
auditors.276
C. Foreseeable User Approach
The third school of third-party auditor liability, a minority position,
holds that the auditor is liable to foreseeable users of the financial
statements. In Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,277 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court framed the issue under examination as
whether "an accountant [may] be held liable for the negligent prepa-
ration of an audit report to a third party [who is] not in privity [with
the auditor but] who relies on the [auditor's] report." 278
The auditor had issued unqualified opinions for calendar years end-
ing 1974 and 1975 "stat[ing] that the financial statements fairly
presented the financial condition [of the company] and that the state-
ments were prepared in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles. '279 Relying on these financial statements and the
auditor's report, the plaintiff, Citizens State Bank, loaned CFA "ap-
proximately $380,000. ''280
In 1977, employees of the defendant accounting firm, Timm,
Schimdt & Company, discovered that CFA's previously audited finan-
cial statements for 1974 and 1975 contained "material errors totaling
over $400,000 .... "281 These errors were not previously discovered by
the auditor during its regular audit. Upon learning of the errors, Citi-
zens State Bank called in its loans.282 CFA then filed for bankruptcy,
was liquidated and eventually dissolved. 283 Citizens State Bank sued
the defendant accounting firm, and its insurer, General Casualty Com-
275. Paschall, supra note 275, at 724.
276. The audit profession knows that the public relies heavily on the auditor's report. Why
then, persist in the fiction that auditors don't know who the intended user is going to be. At a
minimum, it is reasonable to assume that an investor, creditor or supplier will be relying on the
audit information. Therefore, it is likewise reasonable to maintain that the auditor owes a duty of
reasonable care and fair disclosure to that person. Anything short of this approach transfers a
towering burden of diligence and examination to a person who in all likelihood, is further re-
moved from the audit client than is the auditor and is incapable of accessing critical information.
277. 335 N.W. 2d. 361 (Wis. 1983).
278. Id. at 362
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
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pany of Wisconsin, to recover monies lost when it extended credit to
the audit client in reliance on the auditor's report.284
In a case of first impression in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court examined the privity standard enunciated by Ultramares, the
recently enacted Restatement and a then growing minority trend in
the courts holding the auditor liable to third parties.285 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the near privity standard set in Ultramares as
well as the Restatement approach. 286
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the minority trend and held
that an auditor can be held liable to foreseeable third parties. 287 The
court announced that "[t]he fundamental principle of Wisconsin negli-
gence law is that a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable conse-
quences of his act except those . . . limited by policy factors. ' 288 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that "[u]nless liability is imposed,
third parties who rely upon the accuracy of the financial statements
will not be protected. '289 Additional reasons mentioned by the court
in support of its position include the increased costs for credit to the
public and the auditor's ability to "spread the risk through the use of
liability insurance." 290
Although this minority position remains valid in Wisconsin and
Mississippi, 291 its adoption by sister courts and expansion into other
jurisdictions is doubtful given the trend by most state courts to adopt
the Restatement position. 292
284. Id.
285. Id. at 364-66.
286. Id. at 366. The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the Restatement approach on the
basis that it is "too restrictive ... to adopt." Id.
287. Id. at 365.
288. Id. at 366.
289. Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
290. Id.
291. The precedential value of the Mississippi's Supreme Court's decision in Touche Ross &
Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987), is of limited value because the
court's discussion of the foreseeability doctrine is based on an unusual state statue and the
court's finding of no liability on the part of the auditor was based on criminal conduct occurring
after the audit was performed.
292. The minority position was initially adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court. See
Rosenblu, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983), where the court upheld a claim by the plaintiffs
for negligent misrepresentation against the auditors who issued an unqualified audit report for
financial statements that were subsequently found fraudulent. However, the New Jersey State
Legislature subsequently rejected the foreseeability approach when it codified the Restatement
approach in 1995. See 1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 826 (West).
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V. PLAIN ENGLISH RULES2 9 3 AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE
AUDITOR'S REPORT
The SEC enacted plain English rules as part of its initiative to in-
crease the public's understanding of reports filed by companies with
the SEC.294 However, the auditor's report, a mandated accompani-
ment to financial statements filed with the SEC, has yet to adopt plain
English principles.
Specifically, plain English rules provide that in order "[to] enhance
the readablility of the prospectus, [a company] must use plain English
principles in the organization, language, and design of the front and
back cover pages, the summary, and the risk factors section. '295 The
objective of the Plain English rules is to make it easier for the average
investor to understand the information he is reading.296 Plain English
rules require the use of short sentences; definite, concrete everyday
words; active voice; tabular presentation or bullet lists for complex
material; the avoidance of legal jargon or highly technical business
terms; and the avoidance of multiple negatives. 297
Concern over the public's comprehension of the auditor's report is
not a new phenomenon. As evidence of the public's confusion with
the auditor's report, the Cohen Commission Report298 confirmed that
"many users misunderstand the auditor's role and responsibilities, and
the present standard report only adds to the confusion. Users are un-
aware of the limitations of the audit function and are confused about
the distinction between the responsibilities of management and those
of the auditor. '299 The use of vague and abstract phrases such as
"present fairly ... in conformity with generally accepted principles"
have created confusion not only among laymen, but among profes-
sionals within the audit profession. 300 How is an unwary investor ex-
pected to interpret this phrase when professionals themselves are
debating its exact meaning? The lack of clear language defining the
responsibilities and limitations contribute to the confusion and misun-
293. See Andrew T. Serafm, Kicking the Legalese Habit: The SEC's "Plain English
Disclosure" Proposal, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 681 (1998).
294. See Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. 6370-01 (Feb. 6, 1998).
295. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(1) (1998).
296. See generally Plain English Disclosure, 63 Fed. Reg. at 6370-01; see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.421.
297. 17 C.F.R. §230.421(d)(2).
298. The report was "also known as the Cohen Commission, after its chairman, Manuel F.
Cohen." MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING, supra note 82, 1.12.
299. COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 71.
300. See COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 74, where the authors of the report
state that "the phrase has been the subject of widely varying interpretations in the accounting
literature." Id.
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derstanding surrounding the scope and function of the auditor's
report.
Confusion over the auditor's report is furthered when one considers
that "[t]he standard [auditor's] report.., is intended to convey several
separate messages. Some [of its messages] are stated explicitly. How-
ever, other messages must be inferred." 30 1 For instance, "[t]he pre-
sent [auditor's] report only hints that financial statements are
representations of management .... that [the] accounting principles
used [were] appropriate in the circumstances . . . , [and] that the audi-
tor used [professional] judgment in audits. ' 30 2 Enhancing the reada-
bility of the auditor's report which is presently only comprehensible to
an "elite priesthood" 30 3 by clarifying abstractions,30 4 defining techni-
cal terms,30 5 and addressing implied meanings30 6 is consistent with the
SEC's plain English principles mandate to "enhance the readabil-
ity" 30 7 of the prospectus. 30 8 Clarifying the language so that the scope
and function of the auditor's report is understood by a broader base of
individuals will not only benefit the investor, but will also, absent neg-
301. Id. at 73-74.
302. Id. at 74.
303. Howard B. Weiner, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negli-
gent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 235 n.4 (1983).
304. Perhaps the single most misunderstood phrase in the auditor's report is the reference
that the financial statements "present fairly" the financial status of the subject company. The
Cohen Commission Report recognizes that
[s]ome users may expect financial statements to measure financial position and earn-
ings with a degree of precision that is not attainable. It is unreasonable to expect a
short phrase in the auditor's report to covey that message. Thus we recommend that the
phrase "present fairly" be deleted from the auditor's report.
COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 14. This position was later withdrawn when the
AICPA issued its revised standard auditor's report in 1987 which returned to include the 1939
version the phrase "fairly presented."
305. Examples of technical accounting terms currently used in the auditor's report which are
in need of definition include "generally accepted accounting principles" which one court recog-
nized as having as many as seventeen different sources, "generally accepted auditing standards,"
"materiality" and "reasonable assurance."
306. One commentator maintains that the "[t]he phrase in all material respects" informs users
that the auditor's opinion does not attest to the absolute accuracy of the financial statements."
See BOYNTON, supra note 8, at 67.
307. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(1) (2005).
308. Almost all professions have their own specialized jargon. However, a key distinction
separating the audit profession from most other professions is that the auditor, unlike other
professionals, has the ability to influence the behavior of third parties in virtually every corner of
the world with one audit report. In stark contrast, a physician's report or an attorney's report is
intended to influence only the behavior of the intended recipient. Physicians and attorneys deal
directly with identified clients and are immediately available to define or clarify the meaning of a
particular statement. In contrast, an auditor is not readily available to every third party to an-
swer questions nor has he given clarity to the auditor's report by including a glossary of defined
terms to aid the user when reading of the auditor's report.
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ligence by the auditor, benefit the auditor and the company by clearly
placing the responsibility of the financial statements back where it be-
longs, onto the company.30 9
The SEC, through its rule-making power, should extend the plain
English standards to the auditor's report. Given that "[t]he auditor's
standard report is almost the only formal means used both to educate
and inform users of financial statements concerning the audit func-
tion, ' 310 there is much public benefit to be gained in having an audi-
tor's report that is easier to understand, discloses its scope and
discusses its limitations. "Plain English, rather than legalese or techni-
cal terms, enables lay investors to better understand the risks of in-
vesting in a security. ' 311 To that end, the audit opinion can gain
increased credibility among the general public if it is rewritten so that
an average investor will fully appreciate the content of the audit opin-
ion. There already exists a strong movement toward simplification
and increasing understanding of legal documents. 312 Therefore, con-
sistency would dictate extending the plain English movement to cover
the auditor's report.
The elements of a plain English auditor's report should follow the
SEC's mandate and contain simple and clear statements indicating (i)
what was examined, (ii) what an audit is and is not, (iii) the limitations
of an auditor's report, (iv) the auditor's opinion, (v) the scope of ma-
teriality, (vi) the percentage of transactions reviewed (percentage dec-
laration), and (vii) a table of defined terms.
Further, the plain English auditor's report should further explain (i)
that accounting includes estimates, (ii) that the financial statements
are a "snapshot" of the financial condition of the company as of a
certain point in time, and (iii) that Management is responsible for the
information reported on the financial statements. Finally, the plain
English auditor's report should clearly disclose the presence and na-
ture of audit risk and should adequately renounce any reliance on the
auditor's report as an indicator of future performance.
The following plain English auditor's report is offered as a model
auditor's report:
309. Arguably, the insurance industry which seeks to minimize its insured risks in part
through disclosure mechanisms should take an active interest in an audit report that is simpler
and easier to understand and that clearly describes the limits of an audit and allocates responsi-
bility between the auditor, the company and the public.
310. COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 71.
311. Susumu Miyazaki, Should Japan Adopt A Plain Language Rule?, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 1, 8 (2004).
312. See George H. Hathaway, Plain English in the Twenty Types of Legal Documents, 75
MICH. B.J. 684 (July 1996).
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REVISED AUDITOR'S REPORT
Date
To the shareholders of XYZ Inc.
What was examined.
We have audited the financial statements (i.e. balance sheet, income
statement and statement of changes in financial position) of XYZ
Inc., for the year ending December 31, 20xx. You should know that
the financial statements are prepared using estimates that identify,
measure and record financial transactions to reflect the financial ac-
tivity of the company. You should also know that the objective of
an audit is to evaluate and determine if the methods and estimates
used to prepare the company's financial statements are reasonable.
An audit does not examine every financial transaction affecting the
company. Instead, an audit is meant to provide the company's
shareholders with reasonable assurance that the financial state-
ments represent a reasonable approximation of the financial activity
of the company and that the financial statements are free of signifi-
cant mistakes. You should also be aware that significant items af-
fecting the financial statements may not have been reviewed or
detected. We believe, however, that we have identified and re-
viewed all significant transactions which may substantially affect the
information presented in the financial statements.
Standard of review and materiality.
We have conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing guidelines. These guidelines require that we plan the audit
to review and evaluate enough financial information which, in our
professional judgment, will enable us to form an opinion. You
should know that financial transactions representing less than $xxx /
yyy% were considered as insignificant to the overall financial state-
ments and were therefore, not reviewed by us. You should also
know that we reviewed x% of the transactions, which represents
approximately x% of the balance sheet and x% of the income
statement.
3 13
Snapshot.
You should be aware that the financial statements provide a snap-
shot of a company's financial performance as of December 31, 20xx.
Financial events occurring after this date will change the reported
information. These financial statements reflect historical perform-
ance. The financial statements do not indicate future company
performance. 314
313. Illustration: "You should also know that we reviewed 5% of the transactions, which rep-
resents approximately 50% of the balance sheet and 75% of the income statement."
314. The concept of including a disclaimer is not new. Justice Kennard, in his dissent in Bily,
proposed that the auditor could limit his exposure by disclaiming in his audit opinion liability to
third parties. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co, 834 P.2d 745, 785-86 (Cal. 1992) ("Such disclaim-
ers give fair notice to all potential report users and prevent third parties' reliance from being
reasonable."). By providing a disclaimer, the auditor is placing all prospective parties on notice
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Management's responsibility.
It is management's responsibility to identify, measure, record and
report the financial transactions affecting the company. You should
be aware that management has considerable discretion in selecting
the accounting rules and estimates it uses in preparing financial
statements. Management prepared these financial statements.
Management believes these financial statements are a reasonable
approximation of the financial status of the company as of Decem-
ber 31, 20xx.
Our responsibility and our opinion.
Our responsibility is to provide the shareholders with an opinion
concerning whether the financial statements prepared by manage-
ment are a reasonable approximation of the financial activity for the
company as of December 31, 20XX in accordance with generally
accepted accounting guidelines. 315 Accordingly, in our opinion, the
financial statements of XYZ are substantially accurate and provide
the company's shareholders with a reasonable approximation of the
financial position of the company as of December 31, 20XX.
Limitations and audit risk.
Because we have not examined every transaction, there exists the
possibility that we may have missed an item that may have a signifi-
cant effect on the financial statements. There also exists the possi-
bility that our opinion is incorrect. We believe however that we
have planned and conducted the audit in such a manner as to mini-
mize these risks to an acceptable level.
S/ABC Auditors
VI. CONCLUSION
In the days following the Enron collapse auditors found themselves
under attack as scandal after scandal seeped from the halls of several
prominent American corporations. 316 In the end, the misdeeds of a
few companies and auditors, executed through financial statements
and auditor's reports, created an economic crisis which manifested it-
that his opinion is not to be relied upon as an indicator of future performance because the audit
was not conducted for that purpose.
315. The word "guideline" is being substituted for the word "principle," in the phrase, Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principle." The word "principle" may unintentionally mislead a
reader into believing that the accounting methods used by a company are fixed and determina-
ble. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1539 (2nd ed. 2001) (which
defines "principle" as "an accepted or professed rule of action or conduct"). In contrast, the
word "guideline" does not connote such a rigid application of the accounting methods selected
by the company. Rather, "guideline" suggests to the user a more fluid application of a com-
pany's methods of accounting. See Id. at 849 (which defines guideline as "any guide or indica-
tion of a future course of action...").
316. Public companies that defrauded investors include: Enron, Adelphia, WorldCom, Xerox,
Waste Management, Cendant, Qwest, and Tyco.
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self as a general lack of confidence in the American economy. 3 17 In
response, Congress enacted the SOA to restore public confidence in
the capital markets in general and the audit profession in particular.
The implications of the SOA and its impact on the public, auditors,
companies and attorneys have yet to be fully realized. What is unde-
niable, however, is that as a result of the SOA, attorneys as a group,
must undertake to gain a deeper understanding of how financial state-
ments in general, and an auditor's report in particular, bear upon the
rights and responsibilities of their clients.318
In order to realize the full social benefit of the SOA, the auditor's
report must be reformed. Modernizing the auditor's report will en-
able the public to gain a better understanding of the audit process
itself and become aware of the limitations and inherent risks associ-
ated with an audit. Accordingly, the following initiatives should be
adopted by the Congress as continuing reforms to the SOA. First, the
SEC must modernize its regulation of audit report disclosure. The
SEC must establish minimum content reporting requirements so that
the public is aware of the scope and limitations of the auditor's report.
The framework of the minimum disclosure requirements can be ex-
pected to be the subject of debate among accountants, lawyers and
management. Any debate over minimum reporting standards should
be investor-focused and include a discussion concerning: what an au-
dit is and what an audit is not; the objectives of an audit; the subjec-
tive nature of accounting and auditing; how much of the balance sheet
and income statement is audited expressed in either percentage or
dollar terms; a brief explanation of what GAAP and GAAS are; and
the fact that the financial statements represent historical information
as of a certain date.
Second, the auditor's report should be rewritten adopting plain En-
glish principles to increase its comprehension and readability by the
public. Implicit meanings should be removed, technical terms should
be defined and the audit scope, and limitations should be clearly ex-
pressed. Increased comprehension of the auditor's report gives the
public the ability for better decision making. A plain English audit
report is further justified given that the investor base has broadened
317. The names of Kenneth Lay, former Enron CEO and David Duncan, former audit part-
ner of the now defunct Arthur Andersen, have become synonymous with corporate avarice and
greed.
318. See Warren, supra note 27, at 922 (stating "that corporate counsel ... have lost whatever
comfort they have enjoyed in treating accounting standards as off-limits to their world of legal
principles.").
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as the result of more active and direct involvement by the public
through day-trading and on-line trading activities.
Third, the SEC should exercise jurisdiction over any auditor's re-
port issued by an auditor where the audit affects interstate com-
merce.319 The federal government's jurisdiction can be justified on
interstate commerce principles. 320 Currently, the SOA reforms apply
only to publicly held companies. This approach ignores the numerous
reports that are issued by auditors in the context of privately held
companies that directly affect interstate commerce. 321 Whether a
company is publicly held or closely held, the auditor's opinion, if it
affects interstate commerce, should be subject to regulation by the
SEC.
3 2 2
Today, the auditor's report takes on a greater sense of urgency be-
cause the SOA places increased emphasis on the auditors' practices
and procedures. These practices and procedures ultimately get
filtered to the public through the auditor's report.323 However, the
auditor's report has yet to be reexamined in full by the SEC. When it
does, the focus on reforming the auditor's report should be "not on
whether [the auditor's] report satisfies esoteric accounting norms,
comprehensible only to the initiate, but whether the [auditor's] report
fairly presents the true financial position of [the company] to the untu-
tored eye of an ordinary investor. '324
319. In 1996 the federal government pre-empted many state laws concerning the registration
of securities. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
110 Stat. 3416 (1996). The assumption of this responsibility by the federal government would not
be without precedence.
320. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he Congress
shall have Power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States."
321. For instance, a California bank, relying on the strength of an auditor's report, might
advance funds to an investor group based in New York for an investment in an Illinois closely
held corporation.
322. "The contents of periodic financial statements of corporations were regulated ... by
securities exchanges until the passage of the Securities Act of 1934" when financial information
became federally regulated. Benston, supra note 14, at 1325.
323. "[I]nvestors are 'the most overlooked and underrepresented interest group in America."'
Richard W. Painter, Standing Up To Wall Street (And Congress), 101 MICH. L. REV. 1512, 1512
n.2 (2003),
324. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, 378 F. Supp 112, 121 (1974).
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